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ABSTRACT
In 1992, a prominent Cuban-American organization, the Cuban American National
Foundation, launched a full-scale campaign against the Miami Herald following an editorial
against the Cuban Democracy Act, sponsored by Congressman Robert Torricelli, (D-NJ).
The bill, which the Foundation endorsed and helped craft, was aimed at tightening the
loopholes on the U.S. embargo against Cuba. Two menCCANF Chairman Jorge Mas
Canosa and Herald publisher David LawrenceCrepresented opposing sides of the feud.
CANF galvanized the exile community to support its side of the debate. The Herald used its
opinion and editorial pages to argue against Mas=s charges that the newspaper attacked the
values and culture of the Cuban-American people. The opposing sides symbolized two
distinct paradigms of culture and politics that were vying for control over setting the agenda in
Miami=s public opinion sphere. The battle between a powerful Cuban exile organization and
Miami=s daily newspaper is a defining moment for journalism in the twenty-first century. It
also serves as a cautionary tale for daily newspapers in highly multicultural and heavily
populated metropolitan areas of the nation still struggling to meet the needs of their audiences
while adhering to the tenets of American journalism. A historical analysis sets the groundwork
for future qualitative and quantitative analyses.

iii

Introduction
In 1992, a prominent Cuban-American organization, the Cuban American
National Foundation, launched a full-scale campaign against the Miami Herald. The
CANF and its Chairman, Jorge Mas Canosa, criticized the Herald for what it believed
to be a “continuous and systematic campaign against Cuban Americans, their
institutions, values, ethics and ideals,” (Chardy and Corzo, 1992, p. 3B). Mas’s January
20 statement followed an editorial against the Cuban Democracy Act, sponsored by
Congressman Robert Torricelli, (D-NJ). The bill, which was to be introduced in the
upcoming session, penalized corporations with headquarters in the U.S. that had foreign
subsidiaries engaging in trade with Cuba.
On the other side of the conflict, Miami Herald publisher Dave Lawrence said
that he would “never let this newspaper be intimidated in its ability and determination to
pursue the truth” (Lawrence, 1992, March 22, p. 3C). Each side claimed a broad and
lofty moral high ground that was rooted in basic ideological difference and cultural
tension. Each had a cultural context for believing that their arguments were “true.”
The Cuban American National Foundation was outraged at what they believed
was an inaccurate representation of Cuban exiles and their struggle for democracy in
their homeland. The Miami Herald’s editors were angered by what they argued was an
infringement of their rights under the First Amendment. They also insisted that they
had not been insensitive to the causes and interests of the Cuban community. The
Miami Herald tried to project ideals that journalism scholar Michael Schudson calls
notions of classical democracy with its freedom of expression defense (1995), despite
the fact that it was fighting a war against a substantial part of its consistent and
influential readership. Both positions were part of a cultural and political battle waged
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in the pages of the Herald, encapsulating a decades-long feeling of distrust and
resentment toward media’s role in distorting the image of exiles in their cause for a free
Cuba.
Although none of the literature indicates which side of the conflict “won” or
“lost” in this case, the Foundation’s campaign against the daily newspaper with the
highest circulation in the state is significant for several reasons. One reason is that this
case may be a bellwether for metro-daily newspapers charged with the task of choosing
the news that is fit to print while meeting the needs of its diverse readership. The
CANF’s campaign against the Herald holds lessons for media observers and moguls
who must face declining circulation amidst an ever-diversifying demographic in their
respective metropolitan areas. More than ever, the melding of two different cultural
ideas of “ truth” and “news” are critical components of both contributing to an informed
citizenry and holding on to advertising dollars.
Another reason is that Miami represents an ongoing social experiment of how
the influences of culture, specifically Hispanic emigres, permeate even the most
“American” of institutions, such as media. This is also an interesting case for social
science researchers to observe what happens when institutions claiming to represent two
cultural and political paradigms clash in the competition for power. In this case, it was
the CANF against the Fourth Estate. The Foundation’s conflict with the Herald is an
example of the symbiotic, love-hate relationship between the media and its citizens. As
it faced a completely different demographic of readers, the Herald needed to cater to the
constituency the CANF claimed it represented. Likewise, CANF needed the Herald as
a means through which to tell its side of the Cuba policy story and influence public
opinion.
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In his foreword for the historic report by the Commission on Freedom of the
Press, Robert M. Hutchins writes of the Commission’s awareness that every social
institution influences the development of public opinion and American culture (1947,
vii). However, these influences rarely negotiate through diplomatic and amicable
means to arrive at one well-crafted version of current public opinion. The clash
between the Foundation and Miami’s daily is a vivid illustration of what the Hutchins
Commission warned newspapers about in 1947, that media’s function should vary
within a given social context (p.12). Part of the problem, according to the Hutchins
Commission, is that “the desire to suppress opinion different from one’s own is
inveterate and probably ineradicable” (1947, p. 2). Simply, the Commission suggests
that opposing points of view engage in a struggle that is usually to the detriment of the
minority opinion, a perspective that serves as fodder for such communication theories
as Noelle-Neumann’s Spiral of Silence (1984).
For practical reasons, the Miami Herald’s decidedly Anglo, Northeastern
educated staff writers and editorial board gave way to the demands of a large part of its
influential readership—the Cuban community. Its content and editorial position, for
better or for worse, became more politically conservative following the CANF’s
campaign, reflecting the dominant perspective of its audience (Soruco, 1996, p. 75).
In the case of CANF’s campaign, however, both parties on either side of the
issue had comparable clout and each had equally powerful means through which to send
its message. Lawrence had The Miami Herald ; Mas had Hispanic radio and a top-roots
network consisting of influential business leaders, elected officials, and leaders of
Cuban grassroots activist groups. Central to the conflict was not necessarily a clash of
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cultures—it was the struggle for the supreme control of setting the political agenda and
influencing public opinion, specifically U.S. policy toward Cuba.
Words and symbols represented by the figure of Mas, who spoke of freedom in
the homeland and a call for an end to Castro, utilized the Cubans’ already unsavory
perceptions of media to mobilize the community against the Herald. Lawrence used the
tenets of journalism and free speech to defend the Herald’s editorial position on both
CANF and U.S. policy toward Cuba. This is contrary to more recent perspectives on
ethnic hegemony, such as that of Samuel Huntington.
In his book, the Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the New World
Order (1996), Huntington argues that the spread of democracy following the Cold War
would not solve centuries-long ethnic strife. Thus, in the future, cultural factors such as
faith and ethnicity would be the source of conflict. Even Huntington, however, leaves
Cuba out of the equation in his theory as the last vestige of “Communism,” or what the
Cuban-American community often refers to as Castro’s own brand of Communism,
Fidelismo. He claims democratization was “most successful in countries where
Christian and Western influences were strong” (1996, p. 193).
Yet, Cuba has had a strong Roman-Catholic tradition, dating back to its
occupation by Spain, and had “fridgidaires” and American-made vehicles before most
other Latin American countries. The island nation historically has been a hotbed of
revolution and political upheaval for centuries. Tainted with eras of both European and
American imperialism, it is more likely that forevermore conflicts within Cuba and the
emigre communities in the U.S. will be political in nature. The fact that politics and
culture are indistinguishable in the case of Cuba and Cuban immigrants makes it
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difficult for social scientists to define the roots from which Cuban-American ideology
and culture have developed.
In regard to CANF, it is hard to distinguish whether it was culturally or
politically (or both) at odds with the Herald. Set with the ever-changing socio-political
backdrop that is Miami, defining the “pictures in our heads ” ( Lippmann, 1949) of the
Cuban-American community is key to influencing the public’s opinion of the trade
embargo and immigration policy toward Cuba.
Since research illustrates so little about this heterogeneous group, the best way
to trace the dominant ideologies and attitudes of Cuban-Americans is through local
media, particularly the Miami Herald. In their 1956 book, Four Theories of the Press,
Fred. S. Seibert, Theodore Peterson and Wilbur Schramm argue that social structures
shape the media. To understand how media functions one must look at political and
social structure within a society. The authors contend that, “ To see the social systems
in their true relationship to the press, one has to look at certain basic beliefs and
assumptions which the society holds.” These “beliefs and assumptions” are culturally
constructed. While at the time the three scholars were using their thesis to give the
reader a context for understanding the four theories of the press--the Authoritarian, the
Libertarian, the Soviet Communist and Social Responsibility--the argument still holds
true at the beginning of this millennium, especially since world politics has undergone
such drastic change since the end of the Cold War.
Croucher specifically uses Miami as an example of the processes that construct
public opinion and define social reality in a multi-ethnic community (1997). She also
argues that no framework exists for analyzing ethnic change and struggles for power
within competing groups in Miami. Croucher explains that the social and political
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behavior among ethnic groups may be a preview of future social behavior in diverse
areas of the nation (1996, p. 20). Furthermore, she emphasizes the need for historical
analysis of ethnic political behavior in Miami:
This book argues that historical analysis of intergroup relations in Miami
must not only serve as a backdrop for understanding the contemporary
turmoil but also be seen as the raw material with which ethnic identities
and ethnic conflicts have been socially constructed. It was this long
history of conflict and political struggle in South Florida that produced
the definitions of social reality that now circulate in and about Miami,
definitions that both create and sustain tensions between ethnic groups
(1997, p. 22).
This thesis is a historical analysis of the struggle of values driven by two
competing ideological perspectives. It explores the unattainable standards of balance
and “objectivity” in journalism and the newsroom’s tug-of-war with the interests of the
community it serves. CANF’s campaign against the Miami daily newspaper should be
regarded as a defining moment in journalism that is also a piece of the larger puzzle in
ethnic and media relations. The following chapters will build upon the foundation for
analyzing a conflict that occurred between a distinct political culture shaped by
immigrant experience and an American institution of Libertarianism—the metro daily
newspaper.
To allow for a more comprehensive approach to analysis using media sources, a
qualitative approach is applied through the analysis of first-hand accounts and scholarly
evidence. Anecdotal evidence from different perspectives of the CANF- Herald war,
such as those of journalists, academics, and members of the Cuban-American
community, are included in this work. In addition, the following chapters incorporate
data in the form of publications and journal entries gathered during an internship with
the Cuban American National Foundation. The internship lasted approximately six
weeks during the summer of 1999. Observations were documented in journal entries
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and interviews were conducted with various members of the staff and executive board.
This information was gathered in an attempt to bring more balance to this work, since
CANF has accused many of the newspaper sources cited in these pages of biased
coverage.
Following the introduction, the second chapter consists of a brief history of
Cuban emigres and a more comprehensive history of CANF, including background on
its founder, Jorge Mas Canosa. The successive waves of Cuban immigration after 1959
contributed to the political culture and demographic heterogeneity of the Miami enclave
and therefore deserve mention. The third chapter will provide a history of the CubanAmerican community’s clashes with media leading up to the attitudes and behaviors
that prompted its protest against the Herald. The fourth chapter will document the
CANF’s campaign. The fifth chapter will discuss the historical implications of this
campaign against a daily newspaper, which aims to represent the interests of a dynamic
and politically charged ethnic community. Chapter six will conclude this work and
make suggestions for future research.
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History of the Miami Enclave
Miami is an explosively diverse city. Within the boundaries of Dade County,
immigrants of diverse cultures have settled in ethnic enclaves such as Little Havana,
Little Haiti and the predominantly Nicaraguan Sweetwater area. In addition to the
emigre enclaves, the city is also home to a large Jewish population, located in North
Miami and Miami Beach, and several African American communities such as Liberty
City. Such a diverse population makes Miami a volatile urban area in which cultures
constantly challenge the boundaries of society and politics.
The influence of immigration is also apparent in cities such as New York and
Los Angeles. What makes Miami unique from more established cities with a
significantly diverse population, however, is the effect that Cuban emigres have had in
completely changing South Florida’s economic and social landscape. Likewise, no
other ethnic minority has had as profound an impact on Miami politics as the Cuban
population. The successive waves of migration have helped to construct the hierarchy of
ideology that is represented by the older, more conservative exile community. Miami
continues to evolve as it continues to suffer from an identity crisis “ in the face of rapid
…social and political change” (Croucher, 1997). Miami underwent this swift and
pervading transformation after Fidel Castro’s revolution, which sent scores of Cubans
into what they thought would be a temporary exile only 90 miles away.
In the 1950s, Cuba enjoyed one of the fastest growing middle classes of
Caribbean and Latin American countries. Yet, it still suffered from upper and lower
class disparities, which were particularly apparent when comparing the rural and urban
areas (Portes, Bach, 1985, p. 140; Thomas, 1983, p. 3). Tensions between the classes
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were further exacerbated by rampant corruption in business and government. The
tradition of corruption in politics had been in place before Cuba gained its independence
from Spain. Indeed, Cuba suffered through a cycle of corruption that ultimately
resulted in revolution from the time of its independence, which was led by Cuban
patriot Jose Marti.
Through four governments that purported to being more democratic than the
previous, the Cuban people dealt with a growing gap between the lower and upper to
upper-middle class. While sugar exports and tourism provided a booming economy in
Cuba during the early 50s, most of the wealth, approximately 60 percent, went to the
upper class, which comprised 20 percent of the total population at that time (Boswell,
Curtis, p. 19, 1983). These socioeconomic conditions and a weak government helped
set the stage for Castro’s revolution.
The literature indicates several waves of immigration that vary in number.
Agreement on the distinct phases of immigration is unclear, as some social scientists
indicate seven (Boswell, Curtis, 1983), and others describe five (Casals, 1979). This
work will describe three, as does Gonzalo Soruco, whose research on media attitudes in
the enclave is at the core of the issues explored in this paper. All three phases, which
include the arrivals of the “Golden Exiles,” the emigres from freedom flights, and the
refugees of the Mariel Boatlift follow Castro’s overthrow of the Fulgencio Batista
regime in 1959. The boatlift will be more comprehensively described since that last
significant immigration phase was part of a catalyst for political galvanization in the
Miami enclave.
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The Golden Exiles
The first wave of emigres following the revolution was composed mostly of the
upper-class urbanites of Cuba, including doctors, lawyers and businessmen who
prospered under Batista’s government and the Cuban economy. Cubans in this group,
arriving between 1959, New Year’s Day, and 1962 are referred to as the “Golden
Exiles” because of their affluence and high level of education (Boswell and Curtis,
1983, Soruco, 1996, Torres, 1999).
Conservative estimates suggest that 215,000 Cubans arrived in the U.S. at that
time (Boswell, Curtis, 43, 1983). According to Llanes, this group was largely
homogenous, exhibiting political values similar to those of the Republican party in the
United States (p. 9, 1982). The Cuban missile crisis of October, 1961 put an end to all
direct flights to America. During the period of 1962 to 1965, 74,000 Cuban emigrated
by boat or through intermediate countries. Those who emigrated to the United States
through intermediate countries did so most notably through Spain or Mexico ( Boswell,
Curtis, p. 48, 1983; Garcia, p. 35, 1996; Soruco, p. 8, 1996).
It is also important to note that both the government and media helped to
reinforce the image of the “golden exile.” The swift acceptance and resettlement of this
first wave, which was fleeing the immediate danger of a Communist coup, generated a
positive and supportive sentiment from the American public at that time. It was
particularly easy for the U.S. government and media to construct an image of “Golden
Exiles” from a group of upper and upper-middle class professionals who were staunch
anti-Communists. Allman asserts that even from the beginning, the story of Cuban
immigration has been the stuff of “legend, romance and myth.”
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Others argue that “the Cuban success story” was seen so often in media that it
created a stereotype (Llanes, 1982, 47). Croucher, for example, argues that the Cuban
success story functioned to suit the interests of “certain individuals and groups, whether
North American capitalists, U.S. politicians, or Cuban exiles” (Croucher, 1997, 140141). Media helped reinforce this stereotype with such articles as “Those Amazing
Cuban Emigres” (Alexander, July 1966). This successful “golden” image, however, was
in sharp contrast to the public sentiment toward later migrations, specifically the Mariel
boatlift.
The Freedom Flights
The next major phase of immigration was the period of the Freedom Flights,
which took place from 1965 to 1973. In the aftermath of negotiations for prisoners of
the Bay of Pigs invasion and following the missile crisis, Castro announced that he
would allow those with relatives in the U.S. to leave the island beginning on October
10, 1965. Cubans were to be picked up by their U.S. relatives from the seaside town of
Camarioca. Hundreds of boats and seacraft attempted to travel the 90-mile journey to
Cuba. Some vessels were unsuccessful in crossing the Florida Straits and were
intercepted in international waters. The Johnson administration began negotiations with
the Cuban government for one of the first in a long line of immigration policies. These
would later take center stage in the politics of the enclave and influence political
attitudes toward subsequent administrations.
The “memorandum of understanding” as part of H.R. 2580 established an airlift
with flights twice a day, five days a week between Miami and Havana. Approximately
297,318 Cubans emigrated by plane to the U.S. until the end of the flights in 1973.
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Blue-collar and rural workers largely comprised this group of emigres (Boswell, Curtis,
1983, p. 48-49; Croucher, 1997, 106; Garcia, 1996, p. 42-43; Torres, 1999, p. 71).
Torres also points out that this group was more ethnically diverse, including emigres
from Jewish and Chinese populations of Cuba (1996, p. 43).
The Mariel Boatlift
More than 125,000 Cubans left the island between April 21 and September 26,
1980. As a means to generate revenue and illustrate to the exile community the success
of his revolution, Castro announced in 1978 that he would allow week-long visits from
U.S. relatives. The exiles brought as many goods as they could carry to their families in
Cuba, attesting to their stories of success in America. Among the gifts visitors brought
to their Cuban relatives were designer blue jeans. The collective effect of these visits
came to be known among social scientists and historians as the “blue jeans revolution”
(Olsen and Olsen, 1995, p. 80). The next wave of immigration lasted only five months
but had a detrimental effect on the image of the exile community.
Cubans grew increasingly restless with their economic situation after visiting
with their exile relatives and expressed the desire to leave the island. In April 1980,
Castro announced that any Cubans wishing to leave the country could do so through the
Peruvian embassy. Days later, more than 11,000 people requested to leave in the midst
of staged demonstrations protesting the gusanos, or traitors to the revolution. Realizing
the opportunity to pump some American currency into the Cuban economy, Castro
cancelled emigration through the Peruvian embassy and ordered departure through the
Mariel port.
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Castro did not anticipate the large number of Cubans wishing to emigrate. Once
again, el lider took advantage of a situation that nearly revealed the empirical failure of
his revolution and decided to use the boatlift as a means through which to export his
“undesirables.” When U.S. relatives arrived to pick up Cuban family members, they
waited for days in their boats until they were allowed to board their passengers. Upon
receiving their relatives, they were forced to accept strangers who may have been
criminally insane persons or social deviants (Olsen, Olsen, 1995, p. 81).
Castro publicly announced that he was using the Mariel exodus as a means of
purging the social and biological misfits from Cuba. According to several accounts,
that aspect of the boatlift story was highly publicized with largely inaccurate
information obtained by media. (Garcia, 199, p. 65; Jorge and Moncarz, 1987, p. 25;
Olsen and Olsen, 1995, p. 81; Portes and Bach, 1985, 87). An estimated 26,000 emigres
had criminal records. Most of them had been imprisoned for violations of la ley de la
peligrosidad (Garcia, 1996, Pg, 64), or the law of dangerousness, roughly translated.
Offenses ranged from prostitution to dealing on the black market. Others were political
prisoners. Approximately 2,500 of the arrivals were hard criminals and were
subsequently imprisoned in a Georgia Federal penitentiary. A few hundred more were
placed in mental institutions (Jorge and Moncarz, 1987, p. 25) The U.S. government
was overwhelmed with this unanticipated wave of migration. More Cubans settled in
America in 1980 than during the period of arrival of the “Golden Exiles” in 1959-1963.
To some extent, the negative attitudes toward the Mariel immigrants stemmed from the
public’s more ominous reactions to media reports that exaggerated certain
characteristics of race and gender in this group. Garcia cites that the Washington Post,
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for example, reported that nearly 20,000 Cubans were homosexual when the estimate
was actually 1,000 as reported by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (1996, p.
65). Included in this group were a larger number of blacks and mulattos of a lower
socioeconomic status (Boswell and Curtis, 1983, p. 56; Soruco, 1996, p. 10; Garcia,
1996, p. 68).
With the Marielitos came the shift in immigrant rhetoric. They were no longer
regarded as exiles, but rather as refugees. They came during years of economic
recession in the 1980s within a five-month time period. Most of them settled in Miami
(Jorge and Moncarz, 1987, p. 26). All of them had lived under Castro’s socialism for
more than 20 years. Combined with the negative perception created by the news that
Castro had unleashed rabid criminals and mental patients within this group, Mariel
emigres were not warmly welcomed in Dade County. Even Cuban-Americans greeted
this wave with hesitation, in fear that their golden narrative of success might be soiled
by this younger, darker and ideologically different group (Boswell and Curtis, 1983, p.
56; Arocha, March, 23 1981, p. 2b).
Each wave of immigration helped to build an inadvertent hierarchy of power,
beginning with the first arrivals—the “Golden Exiles.” This group was the most
powerful and had been empowered by the initial rhetoric of success of the Johnson and
Nixon administrations. By the time the Mariel refugees arrived on the scene, the wave
that fled with the Batistianos had established themselves after more than twenty years
of exile. They were the mostly professional status men and women who fled the
immediate dangers of Communism. The elements of time and economic advancement
ensured that the political perspectives of the Golden Exiles became the dominant
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ideology of the Cuban-American community. A Cuba-away-from-Cuba culture has
continued to flourish in a city that Cubans still call el exilio, or exile.
The conservative politics of the exile community were not just dominant
perspectives shared in conversations at local coffee shops or at family gatherings. The
exile ideology was immediately put into practice upon arriving in Miami. Cubans
recreated their self-governing townships, or municipios, that existed among the six
provinces of Cuba before the revolution. Approximately 114 of these townships were
re-established by 1962, and were represented in a federation called the Municipios de
Cuba en el Exilio. While each one of these townships functioned as a social
organization that also helped familiarize subsequent waves of Cuban immigrants with
life in the U.S., these groups were also deeply involved in politics. For example,
representatives from 110 of these townships assembled through the Junta Patriotica
Cubana, one of the first anti-Castro political organizations in exile (Boswell, Curtis, p.
176; Garcia, p. 91-92).
In the same way that Cubans need not be assimilated to participate in the
democratic process, they also need not be assimilated to use media and contribute to its
dialogue (Soruco, 16, 1996). In particular, the exiles brought with them a tradition of
radio usage from their homeland. Following Castro’s revolution, the U.S. government
took advantage of this medium in its public opinion war against the regime. The CIA
selected exiles to bombard the airwaves with anti-Castro propaganda through Radio
Swan in 1961. With the government’s consent, the exile community continued a style
of talk radio that is far from apolitical.

15

The first wave of emigrants created the foundation for AM radio formats.
Stations such as WQBA, “La Cubanisima,” and WAQUI, “Radio Mambi” are still
popular outlets of media among older Cubans, even after the advent of the Internet.
Political candidates still pander to their prospective Cuban-American constituents via
the airwaves. These stations have been successful largely because they reflect the
attitudes of the dominant conservative ideology. Spanish-language largely serves as a
means through which to perpetuate the dominant exile ideology and reinforce its power
in the enclave (Perez, 1992, p. 99). Columnist Liz Balmaseda referred to Miami as a
“community where candidates traditionally stroke exile radio commentators, where they
can make or break a campaign” (1992, Oct. 24, p. 1B). Today AM talk radio continues
to serve as an important means through which to galvanize the Cuban-American
community.
Contrary to the assimilation perspective, the American culture did not have a
hegemonic effect on this group. Instead, what occurred was something social scientist
Alex Portes suggests is acculturation-in-reverse (1995, xiv). In fact, several
investigators of Cuban-American sociology have noted the empirical failure of the
assimilation theory in predicting the behavior of the enclave (Portes, 1992, xv;
Croucher, 1997, p. 8; Portes, Clark, and Cobas, September 1980). After several
generations in the U.S., Cuban-Americans have not clearly followed the natural
progression of assimilation theory through its cultural, structural, marital and
ideological stages, as theorized by Milton Gordon in the early 1960s. Yet they grew
accustomed to American political practices and quickly realized that the only possible
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way to free their homeland was to take their cause for a free Cuba to the halls of the
nation’s Capitol.
Ironically, media, along with politicians and other public officials, that helped
create a “golden exile” image of Cuban Americans, had the power of this image thrust
upon them. Politically active Cuban-Americans began to participate in the influencing
of public opinion, bringing with them their own notions of “balance” and “truth.” As
Cuban-Americans grew in numbers, they heavily participated in the democratic process
while they and their children became prosperous in business.
Cuban-Americans mobilized their constituencies by reinforcing the solidarity of
support of la lucha, or the cause of a free democratic Cuba. In a short time, Cuban
Americans were able to organize themselves to wield political power in Washington.
CANF Background
By 1981, this growing political participation served as a catalyst in the
formation of the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF), the most effective
mobilizing force behind the Cuban American community. Cuban American emigres
experienced traumatic life-altering events, which have made them intolerant to any prodialogue perspectives on U.S.-Cuba policy. The uncompromising position that CANF
has taken on behalf of the Cuban-American community has been a major source of
political friction in Miami (Perez, 1992).
CANF was established at a time when Cuban-Americans became increasingly
disillusioned with the Anglo establishment in Miami. The formation of this more
politically sophisticated organization came after the Mariel Boatlift when the “Golden
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Exile” discourse began to dissolve. Carter’s flip-flop decisions during the boatlift and
the economic recession under his administration added to a climate of frustration.
The image of Cuban-Americans began to present a double-edged sword. On the
one hand, the sentiment was that the affluent Cuban community had taken over and
forced a white flight from Dade County. One author explains that by 1980, nearly a
third of its Anglos moved out of the Dade County area, leaving behind a void in its
population—a void that was later filled by the large influx of immigration (Portes,
1992, p. xiv).
On the other hand, Mariel refugees did not arrive with the same affluence and
education as its golden predecessors. Furthermore, with Miami completely saturated
with Cuban culture, the novelty of welcoming the “Golden Exiles” had worn thin. By
1980, many of the exile entrepreneurs who arrived during the first wave of immigration
were now successful businesspeople and leaders in the Cuban-American community.
At this time, veteran hardline exiles were ready to take la causa to the next level.
One of these leaders, arguably the most prominent figure in the CubanAmerican community, was Jorge Mas. Born in 1939 in Santiago, Cuba, Mas would
become the vital link between the exile community and opinion leaders. Mas’s life is a
narrative that is sparse in the literature, especially in regard to specific instances that
may have been controversial. First, an explanation of Mas’s life’s work for la causa
illustrates that financial success did not precede political awareness for most Cuban
exiles. The experiences from Castro’s revolution shaped not just an ideology but a
political culture. Networking within the political and influential circles of the exile
community helped pave the way for successful businessmen. Second, Mas’s story

18

denotes a broader historical and personal context for evaluating his actions in the
campaign against the Miami Herald.
In the most poignant homage to the exile leader’s life, Ninoska Perez Castellón
writes about his early days as a political activist (1998). Evidence suggests that even in
primary school Mas gravitated toward the power of the spoken word. In his
adolescence, he was already making commentaries on Cuban radio, which, as Nestor
Feliu explains, resulted in Mas’s first exile from Cuba under the Fulgencio Batista
dictatorship (translation, 1997, p. 38). Ironically, media, particularly broadcast, held a
strong attraction for Mas. He returned to Cuba after the revolution. As a young law
student, he was exiled a second time when he publicly confronted Castro at a university
event (Hockstader , Booth, 1992 , March 10, p. A1).
Mas’s work toward a free Cuba began in the early 1960s, upon his arrival in the
United States. After the failed U.S.-backed Bay of Pigs invasion, Mas enlisted in the
army, in the hopes, Felíu elaborates, that the next campaign would be a success (1997,
p. 39). He soon abandoned military life, however, when he realized that it would not
lead to an imminent effort to end Castro’s rule.
In 1960, he was a radio commentator for biweekly broadcasts to Cuba on Radio
Swan (Elliston, 1999, 221). He wrote for small daily newspapers in the exile
community, such as Liberación, which, along with radio, were the main form of media
within the Cuban exile community. His natural talent for broadcast commentary
established him as young leader within the exile community. Mas was the leader of the
younger exile community as head of the Juventud Cubana.
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In between rallies, local radio addresses, and writing articles for the small
dailies, Mas delivered milk, as well as the latest news from Cuba, door-to-door to
Miami residents. “Sometimes,” Mas commented, “I didn’t have enough time to change
before a speech so I went in my milkman’s uniform” (Pérez-Castellón, 1998, p. 37). He
was the leader of RECE, Representation of Cuban Exiles, one of the first anti-Castro
groups, and was the editor of its monthly publication (Felíu, 1997, p. 33). In 1964 on
his first trip to Washington as a RECE representative, the rising exile leader realized the
importance of political participation in the democratic process. (Pérez-Castellón,1998,
p. 45). Between the late 60s and early 80s, Mas initiated contact with important
politicos, such as Henry Kissinger and Jeane Kirkpatrick. He went beyond the familiar
radio media in the Cuban enclave to make appearances on such television programs as
“The Today Show” in 1975 (Pérez-Castellón, 1998, p. 50). Curiously, he forged a
highly successful presence with media in these early years—a relationship that would
later become volatile.
In 1981, Mas’s vision of a more sophisticated political lobbying amalgam
culminated in the creation of the Cuban American National Foundation. At the first
meeting, fifteen Cuban exiles established the flagship executive board of directors.
The CANF statement of principles and objectives asserts the main goal of the
organization is to “challenge the myths propagated by the Cuban government. ” The
same publication also declares that CANF serve as vehicle to “clarify public opinion,
fight bigotry, protect human rights, and promote Cuban culture and achievements”
(CANF, 1981, p. 4).
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CANF, a non-profit organization funded by its members, boasts more than
54,000 active members. Its initial objective was to establish a means to combat
Castro’s propaganda apparatus. The foundation would function as a vehicle that would
inform the public about internal issues, such as human rights violations. The
organization would also inform the public about external issues, such as new policy
toward the island nation (Fundacion Nacional Cubana Americana, 1992). Essentially,
the organization would serve to sway public opinion away from the romanticism of
Castro’s revolution, and toward a harsher view of human rights abuses on the island.
CANF executive board continues to be composed of affluent Cuban self-made
businessmen, who, according to spokesperson Mariela Ferretti, “ put their money where
their mouth is” ( Personal interview, July 17, 1999). CANF continues to have a board
composed of approximately 60 executive board members, who continue the tradition of
an annual $10,000 contribution. The executive board members are also primary
decision-makers of the organization. At their annual meeting, el Congresso, board
members from all of their offices meet to discuss the following year’s agenda.
According to presentation materials from its 16th annual meeting, CANF has 10
chapters located in major cities in the nation and abroad, in addition to its office in
Washington, D.C. The chapters are located in Puerto Rico, New Jersey, New York,
Chicago, Los Angeles, Orlando, Jacksonville, New Orleans, and Tampa (CANF, July
18, 1999). The Foundation established a chapter in Spain and also briefly opened a
chapter in Moscow under President Boris Yeltsin (Perez-Castellon, 1998, p. 113).
The Foundation uses member contributions for its programs, which fall under
the umbrella of the Jorge Mas Freedom Fund. The Endowment For Cuban American
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Studies sponsors scholarly endeavors, such as seminars, research grants and publication.
The Mas Family Scholarships offers competitive financial aid to college students.
The Foundation For Human Rights has been one of the most effective and
highly respected efforts of the organization. This program was directed by one man,
Luis Zuniga, a former political prisoner in Cuba. Until his recent resignation from the
Foundation, Zuniga represented CANF at the annual meeting of the United Nations
Commission on Human Rights, which has condemned Cuba’s treatment of dissidents,
activists and political prisoners before the international community. The human rights
division of the Foundation has been absolutely instrumental in giving independent
journalists and political dissidents a voice through tape-recorded reports conducted
through phone calls. CANF members transcribe the information and send it out to
media outlets or post press releases on the Foundation website.
Aside from the programs that fall under the CANF financial umbrella, executives
established the Free Cuba Political Action Committee. Free Cuba PAC, for example,
contributions to federal candidates during the 1997-1998 year totaled $102,500, with
$53,500 going to Democrats and $49,000 going to Republicans (Center for Responsive
Politics, 1999). By 1986, CANF’s operating budget was $1.5 million (Garcia, 1996, p.
150). Through the leverage of the Free Cuba PAC and Mas’s influential Washington
contacts, CANF gained considerable influence during the Reagan and Bush
administrations.
One of its most important and controversial achievements, however, was in the
policy arena. In 1985, CANF helped to establish the federally funded Radio Marti,
through a major lobbying effort and the support of the Reagan Administration. Reagan
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and Mas engaged in a political courtship that would later prove mutually beneficial. By
the time Reagan accepted CANF’s invitation to give a speech before its members and
the exile community in 1983, Mas was already involved in plans for establishing Radio
Marti. Observers may recall the news footage of Reagan enjoying black beans and rice
at la Esquina de Tejas, a popular restaurant in Little Havana where he had his famous
Cuban-style meal. Since Reagan, many other candidates have made their rounds in
Miami, vying for support from the Cuban community. In 1999, CANF invited Donald
Trump to one of their functions. However, no candidate has been able to politically
court the exile community as well as Reagan did through his relationship with Jorge
Mas.
When the Reagan administration put together a Presidential Commission on
Broadcasting to Cuba to explore possibilities for Radio Marti, Mas was appointed the
head of the executive board. After two years of lobbying, Radio Marti, one of the
foundation’s greatest victories, became a reality under the Reagan administration. The
president subsequently appointed Mas as chairman of the advisory board of Radio Marti
until his death in 1997. The exile leader was also the driving force behind the
establishment of TV Marti through his influence in the Reagan and Bush
administrations. The establishment of both outlets was shrouded in controversy.
Several members of both the Cuban-American and broadcast communities criticized
Mas’s hold on both media, often portraying Radio and TV Marti as tools of CANF
propaganda.
One of the most compelling criticisms emerged within the staff from station
manager Ernesto Betancourt, who publicly protested the use of the federally funded
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project for Mas’s political goals. Betancourt was dismissed in 1990. TV Marti was
also a contentious program, which the International Telecommunications Union claimed
violated international treaties. In addition, critics said that television reception was
being jammed by the Castro regime (Shannon, 1990). Betancourt would later voice his
criticisms of Mas’s media tactics during the campaign against the Herald.
Each of CANF’s charter members contributed $10,000 (Lidin, 1987, March 29,
p. 26). Many of the members were Bay of Pigs veterans and had been involved exile
politics since their migration across the Florida Straits. Some had been involved in the
sapling political organizations of the municipios that flourished into the Foundation.
The members comprised a wealthy segment of the Cuban-American population. Some
of the more influential members such as Pedro Adrian, developer of the highly
prosperous Adrian Homes subsidiaries, are business leaders in the South Florida
construction industry. Some such as Manuel Cutillas, the owner of Bacardi Rum, are
multi-millionaires with international renown.
The CANF executive board members are a diverse cross-section of exile success
stories in various industries and local civic activities. For example, the stout, mildmannered Felipe Valls made his millions as a restauranteur. He is the owner of the
Versailles, undeniably one of the most important Cuban-American landmarks. During
the day, the corner coffee shop window is a hub for the Cuban business networks.
Situated on Calle Ocho, or Eighth Street, on the way to the Coral Gables business
district, the Versailles is a convenient spot to buy a colada of espresso and rekindle old
business contacts. If there were a place to find out what was going on in the exile
community or the business network, the Versailles would be it. During coverage of the
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Elian saga, reporters flocked to the Versailles to gauge the attitudes of the Cuban
community toward the child’ s possible deportation. In one respect or another, each of
CANF’s members had a uniquely strong connection to the Cuban-American community
and all were essential for the organization’s success.
As Mas garnered clout in policymaking circles, so did he collect enemies and,
more frequently, critics of his leadership style. Several executive directors resigned
from the Foundation under Mas’s leadership, mostly citing irreconcilable differences.
Among them were charter members of the organization, such as Frank Calzon, who
headed the Washington, D.C. headquarters and helped establish the organization with
Mas, and Raul Masvidal, who ran for Miami mayor and lost to Xavier Suarez. During
the CANF’s campaign, many of these personalities, including Masvidal and Betancourt,
emerged in the editorial pages of the Herald in support of the newspaper’s right to
freedom of expression. The tone in which many of these former members of CANF
described Mas was less than cordial.
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Cuban-Americans’ Attitudes Toward Media
“Ha, if I had two years of my life to spare, I would compile the research
necessary to prove the horrible coverage of Cuba by media” (Perez Castellon, Personal
Communication, June 9, 1999). Seven years after the CANF’s campaign against the
Herald, such statements as Ninoska Perez Castellon’s reflect the Foundation’s
continued disdain for American media. Perez, known in the exile community as the
voice of the Foundation is also, according to members of the organization, the heart and
soul of CANF after its founder, Jorge Mas, died (Menendez, 1999, July 26,; Ferretti,
1999, July 13).
Years after CANF campaigned against the local daily and garnered its constant
and particular attention, even the Foundation’s Vice President still says that media “are
all out to get us” ( Del Valle, 1999, June 9). While these statements may suggest a
distrust of media that borders on paranoia, Cuban-Americans’ attitudes toward media
have been shaped by a rocky history.
Since the before the 1959 revolution, the relationship between media and the
Cuban-American community has been ostensibly fickle. The distrust of American
journalism can be traced back to New York Times reporter Herbert Matthew’s famous
interview with Castro in the Sierra Maestra in 1957. After Castro’s first and failed
attempt to overthrow Fulgencio Batista’s government at the Moncada barracks in 1953,
he invited Matthews to his elusive Sierra Maestra camp. Batista had enforced
censorship and Castro was anxious to spread the word that he was alive and that his
large army was still an impending threat. The incident at Sierra Maestra, was what
Daniel Boorstin might call a psuedo-event (1961), and this particular instance of Castro
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produced a pseudo-revolution that arguably played a key role in his ultimate overthrow
of Batista.
The story goes that as Herbert Matthews interviewed Castro about the strength
of his revolution, the same 15 soldiers paraded behind the two men, while at each
stretch they stopped to switch hats, appearing to be a different troupe of guerillas. With
a stage and a virtual script, Castro got the interview that saved his revolution. Because
Batista enforced censorship to prevent rekindling revolutionary support, many believed
that Castro was dead. Not only did Matthews report that el líder was alive and well, he
also attested to a revolutionary force three hundred strong. Matthews painted a
romantic picture of a rebel with a democratic cause. Five years later, Castro declared he
was a Communist (Wallach, 1987).
So began the awkward connection between the American press and the exile
community. In most of the interviews with CANF members in 1999, the mention of
Herbert Matthews’ name was met with at least a smirk. Since that time, the exile
community tends to regard American media as a pawn of Castro’s public opinion
strategy, at least. At most, it is viewed as a willing accessory to Castro’s oppressive
campaign of misinformation, to the detriment the Cuban homeland. With the Matthews
interview as their first impression of liberal media, the exiles’ view of journalism was
tainted with permanent apprehension.
Still, Matthew’s newspaper, New York Times is located far from el exilio in
Miami. Any future gripes and protests would not hurt the newspaper’s bottom line.
This was not true for the Miami Herald, situated in Downtown Miami just minutes from
Little Havana, Florida.
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The negative portrayal of Cubans was a factor that gave rise to both the
formation of the CANF and the Cuban community’s growing animosity toward the
Herald. The Mariel boatlift, which changed the rhetoric toward the enclave
community, caused a collective resentment among the non-Hispanic citizens of Dade
county. Thomas Boswell and James Curtis argue that, although the coverage of CubanAmericans in media could be characterized as uneven at worst, it had been essentially
positive, up until the Mariel immigration wave (1984, p. 6). According to
Congresswoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, the U.S. media has exhibited the tendency to
hold liberal views on Cuba:
The media fails to focus on the human rights abuses and the
crackdown on peaceful dissidents and very rarely do they venture out
into areas outside of the tourist hotels and hospitals and instead they
focus their coverage on such things as sporting events. They often
trivialize the suffering of the people of Cuba by failing to recognize the
oppressive conditions in which they live and in playing up Castro as
some type of heroic figure instead of the tyrant that he truly is (1999,
September).
One of Lehtinen’s Congressional aides agrees that media often romanticize
Castro and tend to be more sympathetic to his Communist revolution than to the
regimes of the Right. “Whether it be Dan Rather or Barbara Walters, reporters don’t ask
the same probing questions they would ask of Pinochet. They treat Castro with kid
gloves” (Pollack, 1999, August 13).
Gonzalo Soruco’s Cubans in Mass Media in South Florida (1996) brings to light
the complexity of the tenuous relationship between American media and the Cuban
enclave. He discusses the contrasting perspectives of assimilation versus conflict and
consciousness theory (1996, Pgs. 27-29). Consciousness theory is much more
applicable than assimilation theory in the case of the Cuban enclave, especially in
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regard to media. As the enclave grew, and exiles held on to pre-Castro Cuba and the
subsequent waves of migration added sociological layers to the community, the Cuban
community continued to reinforce its social and political culture. Media in the enclave
mirrors that phenomenon. The consciousness of the enclave developed thorough
experiences such as exile and immigration. The experiences of the Cuban exiles have
made them distrustful of liberal democratic institutions, most notably American media.
The Miami Herald was part of the liberal media establishment in the early 1980s
and had not yet come to terms with the ideological differences between the newsroom
and its Cuban readership. The newspaper’s tone and editorial position was only a
reflection of the tense and highly political environment that followed the arrival of the
refugees. For example, as gesture of welcome, the Metro-Dade Commission passed an
ordinance officially making the county bilingual in the early 1970s. In 1980, native
Miamians mobilized and pushed a referendum to make English the only language
recognized by Dade county (Olson and Olson, p. 87).
With the inaccuracies reported about the supposed Marielitos in such national
publications as the Washington Post and the Wall Street Journal, Cubans felt American
media was indifferent and, at times, discriminatory in its news and editorials (Garcia,
1996, p 65; Portes and Stepick, 1993, p. 53). Today, journalists admit that the Herald
largely ignored the needs of Cuban community ( Lizza, 2000, p.18; 1992, p. 24). In a
1999 interview, Kirk Reagan Menendez, who currently serves as CANF’s vice
president, agrees that the misperceptions of the Cuban community have been caused by
the media and the public’s indifference to cause for a free Cuba (June 1999).
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One scholarly work underscored the critical role that the Miami Herald played
in perpetuating divisiveness among ethnic groups in Miami:
Many analysts and interview respondents emphasized the very critical
role the media, and particularly the Miami Herald, has played in
dramatizing events, manipulating symbols, and creating or perpetuating
perceptions that foster divisiveness among different racial and ethnic
groups in the metropolitan Miami area (Croucher, 1997, p. 94).
Leaders of the Hispanic community claimed that the Herald was biased in its
coverage of the Cuban community, even before the Mariel boatlift. One example was
when Miami Mayor Maurice Ferre accused the Herald of “anti-Latin bias and “breeding
divisiveness among Miami’s Latin community” at an Associated Press conference in
1978 (Miami Herald, p. 19). By the 1980s, The Herald was virtually isolated from the
Cuban community and political change, as Soruco explains,
During the 1980s, while Ronald Reagan was mesmerizing the nation
with his own agenda and calling for a return to conservative values, the
Herald stubbornly stayed the liberal course in its editorial and reportorial
policy. Weaned as its editors were on the solid traditions of American
journalism and the principles of press freedom, objectivity, and
responsibility, they found the idea of buckling to the demands of exiles
painful and even ominous (1996, p. 41-42).
Another article in the New Republic agreed with the Cuban community view that
the Herald badly treated this significant segment of its readership.
The Herald’s treatment of Miami’s Cuban-Americans was grossly
insensitive, bordering on xenophobic. So when the Cuban-Americans, in
part motivated by that coverage, began to organize into a political force
in the mid-80s, it was hardly a surprise that they flexed some of their
muscle in the Herald’s direction (Lizza, 2000, p. 18).
The media’s attitudes toward the growing Cuban-Americans served to further
politically mobilize the enclave, which preserved a festering resentment toward
the local newspaper. In particular, the Cuban-Americans galvanized against any
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attack on the dominant conservative ideology, which most prominently appeared
in the pages of the Herald’s editorial section.
CANF greatly supported and, more important, played an integral role in
legislation to tighten the trade embargo on Cuba instituted by the Eisenhower
Administration. May 24, 1987, the Herald ran an editorial that supported legislation that
would close the loopholes on the trade embargo ( p. 5B). Despite its editorial position
at times, Cuban-Americans still felt that the Herald was guilty of bias against their
community and politics.
The Foundation ran its first one-page advertisement in the Herald on October
19, 1987, claiming that both its editorials and news were biased against the Cuban
American community. The ad placement, signed by all 49 executive directors and
trustees of the foundation, came just one month before the Herald began to publish the
Spanish-language El Nuevo Herald. Among other charges, CANF argued that,
The Miami Herald’s abuses go beyond insensitivity. Over the years, the
Herald has exhibited a pattern of neglect, manipulation and censorship
of Cuban and Cuban-American news (CANF, The Miami Herald, 1987,
October 19).
The ad further claimed that the entire Cuban community would be at odds with
the Herald “until it adopts a balanced editorial and news coverage policy”
(CANF, The Miami Herald, 1987, October 19).
Some leaders in the Cuban-American community disagreed with the CANF’s
decision to place the advertisement, arguing that it further divided an already segmented
community. City Commissioner Joe Carollo, who would run against two foundation
supported opponents upon re-election that year, openly blasted the CANF as a “clique
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of millionaires who have made a very profitable business out of combating Communism
but who really want to take control of the city of Miami” (Volsky, 1987, October 25).
In the effort to reach out the Cuban community, Knight Ridder, the parent
company that owns the Miami Herald, hired David Lawrence in 1989 to replace
Richard Capen and become the newspaper’s new publisher. Lawrence, who was an
editor for the Detroit Free Press, was an advocate for civic, or public, journalism
(Lizza, 2000, p. 18). One of the main goals of his tenure was to foster a more amicable
relationship between the Herald and the diverse communities not far from the gates of
the Herald One Plaza. His propensity to bring civic involvement into the newsroom was
an important factor in his hire, and he thus employed the growing trend toward public
journalism to achieve that goal.
The public journalism movement grew out of the public’s increased
disillusionment with newspapers and journalists’ professional dissatisfaction with
reporting the news (Charity, 1995, p. 1). Mindich explains that public journalism
“crosses the line from reporting to engaging citizens in seeking solutions” (1998, p.
135). By 1989 this movement in journalism gained considerable momentum, and the
Detroit Free Press, under Lawrence’s editorship, was actively involved in practicing
public journalism, particularly in regard to children’s issues (Charity, p. 123).
To his newsroom colleagues, Lawrence was walking a fine line between
fostering a better relationship with members of the community and sacrificing the
journalistic integrity of the Herald. According to Mike Clary, former Herald staff
writer, Lawrence was considered “ the middle man” among his colleagues at the Miami
newspaper, who tried to serve as a “peacemaker in a community fraught with sweeping
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demographic changes and the ethnic tensions they have aggravated” (1990, p. 33).
Rather than being a public journalist, Clary calls Lawrence the “quintessential corporate
journalist” ” (1990, p. 33).
Lawrence attempted to bridge community differences at a time when the
Herald’s coverage of Cuba displayed an unprecedented degree of negative criticism. He
tried to rein in his newsroom to avoid sparking a conflict with area business leaders and
organizations, particularly when dealing with the Cuban exile community. Soruco cites
that according to Herald staff, Lawrence has been known to tell members of the
editorial board to “tone it down” in regard to editorial criticisms of exile programs and
activities (Clary, 1990, p.33).
Despite Lawrence’s attempts on behalf of the Herald, CANF, which was
considered the most influential lobbying and grassroots organization of that time,
continued to object to the newspaper’s coverage. The greatest backlash often came as a
result of negative reports on or editorials against U.S. policy efforts to tighten the
embargo, as well as other projects in which CANF and its members were involved. The
Foundation was, and continues to be, heavily involved in those efforts and would not
tolerate public dissent from a major institution in its backyard.
In one draft of an opinion piece, one-time CANF president Tony Costa blasts
former Herald editor Jim Hampton for his editorial against the Mack Amendment to the
embargo, which prohibited the foreign subsidiaries of companies with headquarters in
the U.S. from doing business with Cuba. In that draft, Costa contended that the Herald
showed a double standard in its position on the embargo in contrast to its support of
sanctions against South Africa as means to end apartheid.
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In 24 editorials between 1986-1987, the Herald denounced—quite
rightly—the racist regime in Pretoria and called on the Reagan
Administration to impose “full economic and political sanctions on
South Africa” …The Herald may have an explanation for these
contradictory stances, but you have not offered it to your heavily Cuban
American readership, 88 percent of whom support increasing economic
pressure on Castro’s regime (Costa, CANF draft correspondence, 1990).
CANF officials also took offense to the Herald’s coverage of human rights in
Cuba. With its daily communications with dissident groups and independent journalists
in Cuba, the Foundation keeps a keen eye on reports about human rights conditions on
the island. Foundation human rights representatives often challenge local and national
media on its coverage and counter the stories with reports received from Cuban
journalists.
In one letter, Ninoska Perez-Castellon wrote that she was “appalled” by a story
on Cuba’s care of AIDS patients. She cited one report by a dissident journalist group
that prisoners of the same prison that the Herald reported to have visited were subjected
to inhuman conditions, such as routine beatings and malnutrition (Perez-Castellon,
1991, November 11). Her retort, which was sent to David Lawrence, was never
published.
Such exchanges of correspondence became more frequent as CANF’s political
clout grew and became more involved in the crafting of U.S. policy toward Cuba. The
leaders of the Foundation were concerned about the Herald’s coverage and editorial
positions on policies and relationships that they believed would be essential for
achieving their goal of a free Cuba. The communications between Mas and Jim
Hampton, editor of the Miami Herald, became incrementally less amicable as the exile
leader rose as a public figure.
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In one editorial, the Herald called for Mas’s resignation from the President’s
advisory council on Radio Marti, citing a conflict of interest. The Federally-funded
Radio Marti had rebroadcast Mas’s speech at a CANF-sponsored rally at the Orange
Bowl. In his letter to Hampton, the exile leader said it was “easy to predict” the
Herald’s editorial asking for his resignation “because the Herald uses every
opportunity” to question the Radio Marti’s credibility. The letter was only partially
published in the Herald. So Mas sent the letter to El Diario de Las Americas, which
printed it in its entirety ( Diario de las Americas, 1990, February, p. 1A).
After reporting a story from EFE, a Spanish-language news service, alleging that
CANF offered a $50 million loan to the Hungarian government, the Foundation made it
clear to Lawrence that it considered the Herald to be as much of an enemy as Castro.
Mr. Lawrence, we do not seek to insult but we do not intend to dismiss.
We seek redress and a stop to the malicious pattern. A long time ago we
came to the conclusion that the liberation of Cuba would have to be
fought without help from the Miami Herald. Today, we may have to
conclude, as sad as it is, that it must be fought against the Herald as well
as against Castro (Hernandez, 1991, July 3).
Each one of these instances added to CANF’s mounting hostility toward the Herald.
An editorial against the first of the Foundation’s efforts to close the loopholes on the
U.S. trade embargo against Cuba brought these tensions to the fore.
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CANF vs. the Miami Herald
On January 18, 1992, the Herald ran an editorial against a bill due to be
introduced by Congressman Robert Torricelli, a Democrat from New Jersey. As with
the establishment of Radio and TV Marti and the Mack Amendment, a precursor to the
Toricelli bill, CANF was the driving force behind the congressman’s Cuban Democracy
Act. Following the establishment of the North American Free Trade Agreement,
President George Bush vetoed the Mack amendment in 1990 to avoid any gesture that
would infringe upon the spirit of the new agreement with Mexico and Canada. Similar
to the Mack amendment, Torricelli’s bill penalized companies in the U.S. with foreign
subsidiaries in Cuba.
The new bill was the Foundation’s second significant attempt at tightening the
embargo with Cuba. It signified the culmination of all of CANF’s efforts – the
campaign contributions through the Free Cuba PAC and its relationships with the
Reagan and Bush administrations and other world leaders. The importance of the
Torricelli bill is highly emphasized in the Foundation’s materials (1992; Leyva, 1994;
Perez-Castellon, 1998). Its final passage signaled the beginning of CANF’s most
successful years in the policy arena. When it passed, the Cuban Democracy Act helped
lay the groundwork for subsequent legislation, such as the Helms-Burton act in 1994.
So when the Herald ran the editorial against Torricelli’s bill, the Foundation,
specifically Jorge Mas Canosa, began a swift and harsh campaign against the daily that
lasted approximately five months in the spring of 1992. The editorial ran at a crucial
time when maintaining the Cuban-American community’s support of such a measure
was critical to its success in Congress.
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The piece reintroduced some of the familiar arguments against the embargo and
any tightening measures, contending that it would hurt the people of Cuba the most
rather than cripple Castro’s oppressive government. It also blasted the crafting of the
policy, calling it a “ jumble” of embargo measures and that its “intentions were at odds
with its likely results” (1992, January 18, p. A4).
The portion that was likely considered the most damaging to the perception that
the predominantly Cuban-American Miami community supported such a policy was the
metro daily’s call on Congress to defeat the legislation in its entirety:
Congress thus should defeat Mr. Torricelli’s proposal. Making the
embargo airtight will not promote democracy or liberty in Cuba, but it
could promote chaos and catastrophic violence. Perhaps Mr. Torricelli
believes that after the end of lavish Soviet subsidies to Cuba, closing the
few air holes left to the island’s terminally ill economy will unleash
massive disturbances, food riots, or an anti-Castro military coup (1992,
Jan. 18, p. A4).
After the fateful editorial, Mas quickly mobilized his human and material
resources during the following week. He took to the Spanish-language airwaves the
next day with a barrage of complaints against the Herald. The statement accused the
daily of being no better than the Granma, the state-sanctioned newspaper of the Cuban
government. The CANF leader also called on fellow Cubans Roberto Suarez, Miami
Herald Publishing Company president, and Carlos Verdecia, editor of El Nuevo Herald
to resign from the newspaper as a show of solidarity with the Cuban community.
Neither one of the Herald’s highest ranking Cuban employees resigned.
Although the CANF leader’s anger was mostly directed at the Herald, Mas also
addressed the editorial that El Nuevo ran on the same day as the piece condemning the
Torricelli bill. The Spanish daily also ran an editorial on January 18 that compared exile
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leaders to harpies who actively seek their own “Castroism” (Reynaldo, 1992). In
particular, the author claimed that every Cuban in the community had presidential
aspirations, suggesting an inherent characteristic of egotism among Cuban-Americans
(Reynaldo, 1992, p. 12A).
Lawrence and Suarez responded to Mas’ allegations by arguing that the Herald
and El Nuevo Herald had both been fair and balanced in their coverage of Cuba and
local Cubans. Lawrence and Suarez said their “position in support of a free Cuba” had
been “unequivocal” (1992, Jan. 21, p. 5A). Further, they stressed the journalistic duty
of presenting various and, at times, unpopular perspectives in the community’s
newspaper:
It’s also important to point out that the foundation of excellence in
journalism, as well as a democracy, require us to print all sides, even
when we might disagree with a perspective or an opinion. We have
worked hard to be fair, and feel badly when anyone thinks otherwise. We
will always remain willing to try and do even better (1992, Jan. 21, p.
4A).
This exchange between two powerful and important community institutions was
the beginning of a conflict that set in motion a series of events in a city that was already
plagued with divisiveness. During the five months of CANF’s battle with the Herald,
the community witnessed a full-scale campaign against its local newspaper,
investigations by two leading international organizations, and the formation of an antidefamation league.
By Tuesday, January 21, Foundation treasurer Feliciano Foyo approved check
requests to fund an advertising campaign throughout the city of Miami. The CANF’s
message to the community was succinct and clear – “I don’t believe the Miami Herald”
(Appendix A).
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The check request memorandum itemized the cost and quantity of different
types of advertising. The Foundation planned to use busses, billboards, and aerial ads
to influence the rest of the community to withhold support from the Herald. The
billboard would be located on the corner of Douglas Road and Flagler Street facing
east, so that people would read CANF’s message as they headed home after work
toward the sprawling suburbs of West Miami. The Foundation’s defiant declaration
would also be seen on the taillights and sides of 60 buses, respectively. The
organization would then choose two events from a possible three–the Grand Prix of
Miami, the Calle Ocho festival, or the Lipton Tennis Tournament–at which planes
would fly their message overhead. In addition, CANF would use bus benches and
bumper stickers in their campaign plan.
The memo also itemized the cost of printing of a scholarly paper written by Dr.
Fran Matera, an Arizona State University mass communication professor, the Herald’s
bias against the Cuban-American community and the Foundation (Appendix A). The
Foundation tried to implement its advertising campaign with the city’s bus system in
early March. The Metro-Dade Transit Agency temporarily blocked the lease for the ads
until the phrase “paid advertisement” accompanied CANF’s “I do not believe the
Miami Herald” message (Miami Herald, 1992, March 10, p. 2B). The ads first appeared
on March 13.
Tuesday, January 21, was also the day that Mas challenged Lawrence to a public
debate on the Herald’s coverage. On Monday, he had already made the announcement
that the Foundation was launching a campaign, and a public debate was part of the
strategy. Another part of the campaign, Mas announced, was the creation of the Cuban
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Anti-Defamation League “to defend exile ideals” (Chardy, Corzo, 1992, Jan. 22, p. 1B).
Lawrence refused Mas’s challenge, opting instead to “concentrate on putting out the
best possible newspapers” (Chardy, Corzo, 1992, Jan. 22, p. 1B).
During the rest of the week, however, Herald readers watched a debate surge in
editorial pages. Reports of the conflict spilled over onto the pages of El Nuevo Herald
and El Diario de Las Americas, Miami’s other Spanish-language daily. Mas continued
his battle over the airwaves of the exile community. Meanwhile, Lawrence ran the first
of a two-part editorial, “Come on, Mr. Mas, be fair,” which began with the publisher
admitting that “it had not been a pleasant week” (1992, Jan. 26, p. 13A). Again,
Lawrence defended his newspaper’s fairness and balance in covering the exile
community and Cuba:
Nowhere more regularly than in our own editorial pages has a newspaper
spoken out more forcefully against Cuba’s dictatorship–41 editorials in
the past year alone. No newspaper in this country has written more
frequently, or with more insight, about Cuban-Americans–their concerns,
their agonies, their culture (1992, Jan. 26, p. 13A).
Lawrence continued to emphasize Libertarian practices of American journalism,
explaining that the duty of a newspaper is to “inform through its news columns and to
serve as a marketplace of ideas in its opinion pages” (1992, Jan. 26, p. 13A).
Two days later, both on the airwaves and in the pages of El Diario, Mas said he
would take apart each of the Herald’s lies in the following days. He planned a CANF
rally at the Dade County Auditorium to talk about the Herald’s “20 years of silence and
complicity” against Cuban politics. He cited specific instances of negative coverage,
including stories on the Foundation’s Exodus program to relocate Cubans in third
countries to the U.S., and Radio Marti. He vowed that Cubans would stand firm against
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the Miami Herald’s “intellectual terrorism, intimidation and abuses” (Diario de las
Americas, Jan. 28, p. 1A).
Mas attempted a second time to engage Lawrence in a public forum. He invited
Lawrence to a rally in honor of Jose Marti and to have a dialogue on the Herald’s
coverage of the Cuban-American community. Mas told the publisher that Congressman
Torricelli would also be in attendance to discuss the intent of his Cuban Democracy
Act. In part two of Lawrence’s editorial, the Herald printed Mas’s invitation to the
CANF rally at an auditorium near Little Havana, Miami.
A journey of a thousand miles begins with one step. I now ask that you
take your first step. Jose Marti was a man who understood the power of
the written word and the responsibility which must go hand in hand with
such power. It is therefore altogether fitting that you join us on this
special day (1992, Jan. 28, p. 13A).
Lawrence said that Mas’s invitation exhibited a well-meaning effort to engage in
a discussion about the community conflict and he therefore planned to attend the
Foundation event. Until he found out that the conciliatory tone in the invitation was in
sharp contrast with what the Foundation leader was saying on AM radio and in El
Diario.
If I thought that you really wanted a discussion, Mr. Mas, I would be
there. But I’d be a fool to be a party to my own lynching, or anyone
else’s. You don’t start a real discussion by using phrases such as
‘intellectual terrorism.” And you are obviously not intimidated, Mr. Mas.
You, in fact, are the intimidator (1992, Jan. 28, p. 13A).
Between editorial exchanges, members of the Miami community heavily
contributed to the debate. Several letters to the editor were printed throughout the
controversy in the newspaper’s “Readers Forum.” By the end of January, the Herald
was devoting most of its space for opinion, viewpoint and editorials to the dueling
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factions represented by Mas and Lawrence. The letters printed in the Herald and El
Nuevo Herald were largely in support of the newspapers defense of its coverage and its
right to editorial opinion. For example, six out of seven letters printed on January 31
supported the Herald. While the majority of editorials were decidedly in favor of the
Herald, such evidence does not necessarily prove that most of the Miami community
agreed with the newspaper. Since editors oversee the “Viewpoints” section of the
newspaper, the absence of many editorials in support of Mas’s view may illustrate the
possibility that Herald executives intentionally kept those opinions out of its pages.
Mas accused the Herald of censuring the letters to the editor, claiming that the daily’s
editorial pages “have been an exclusive club for a few privileged” members of the
community. He said that in the newspaper’s supposed, “marketplace of ideas, some
ideas were simply more equal than others” (Mas, 1992, Feb. 2, p. 23A).
In that more than 2500-word editorial entitled “A question of basic human
rights,” Mas cited 16 specific instances in which he said the Herald’s coverage was
biased against the Cuban-American people. Among these was Mas’s observation that
since 1989 the Herald had published 13 editorials, mentioning either the exile leader or
the Foundation. Of those editorials, Mas said 10 were unfavorable and three were
neutral.
The piece also addressed the issue of alleged “sexism” within the ranks of the
Foundation. Thus the number of editorials in support of either the Foundation or the
Herald is not indicative of the majority opinion in the community. He specifically
referred to Liz Balmaseda’s column about a recent conference that covered the topic
“The future of women in a free Cuba,” which was organized by Aida Levitan, owner of
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a prominent Hispanic public relations and advertising agency in Miami. Mas was
invited to this conference, but Domingo Moreira, a CANF executive director, attended
in his stead. He was quoted as saying that new laws would not be necessary to protect
women’s rights in a free Cuba. The laws, he said, should be the same for everyone and
success should depend on competition, and not special favors ( Balmaseda, 1991, Nov.
2, p. 3A). Balmaseda wrote that she considered the Moreira’s statement to be rather
ironic “…coming from a lobbying group that had benefited from special federal
programs” that “…allow private groups to sponsor political refugees” ( Balmaseda,
1991, Nov. 2, p. 3A). Further, she pointed out that only three of CANF’s 53 directors
were female.
In his February 2 editorial, Mas said that Liz Balmaseda forgot to mention all
the women who run the Foundation, such as Perez Castellon, Mirta Iglesias, assistant to
the president, and Matilde Quintana, computer systems administrator for the Miami
office (Mas, 1992, Feb. 2, p. 23A).
Levitan, the conference organizer, in a 1999 interview stated that the Foundation
was known as an “elitist and masculinist” organization. Even though women ran
CANF, the decisionmakers were a close-knit group of directors, the majority of whom
were male in 1999. “Jorge Mas Canosa was the ultimate caudillo” (Levitan, 1999,
August 18). Caudillo is a Spanish word that means “strongman,” denoting the tendency
to overpower others at all costs.
During the five-month conflict, several colleagues who Mas had somehow
scorned in the past, such as Masvidal and former Radio Marti director Ernesto
Betancourt, came out of the woodwork to decry CANF’s accusations against the
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Herald. Masvidal surfaced in a Washington Post article attacking Mas by saying that
his “ego is equal only to Castro himself” (Hockstader, Booth, Washington Post, 1992, p.
A1).
The former CANF director and one of Mas’s known enemies, wrote:
Now that my former colleagues of the Cuban American National
Foundation have introduced you to how their form of democracy works,
my thoughts are with you, along with my prayers. Please don’t allow the
Herald to be pushed around (1992, Jan. 31, p. 11A).
Masvidal also lost a mayoral election to Xavier Suarez, whose campaign was strongly
endorsed by the Foundation.
Ernesto F. Betancourt took full advantage of this opportunity to voice his
opposition to Mas in the conflict. The former director of Radio Marti was dismissed
after he and Mas could not agree on the station’s programming (Elliston, 1999, p. 273;
Garcia, 1996, p. 247). In his lengthy opinion piece published in the Herald, Betancourt
expressed the irony of Mas’s accusations against the Herald after having kept a tight
grip on Radio Marti. He said that Mas “ought to know better than to use intimidating
tactics to hinder the freedom of a paper’s coverage.” Betancourt also argued that Mas
was the true intimidator, not the Herald.
Finally, Mr. Mas was convicted of slandering his own brother. Now he
has the gall of organizing a Cuban Anti-Defamation League. Indeed,
such an entity is needed, but to protect Cuban-Americans who disagree
with Mr. Mas from his slanders (Betancourt, 1992, Feb. 18, p. 13A).
By February 6, the Cuban Committee Against Defamation had convened for the
first time. Its mission was to determine prejudice in news reports and observe the
portrayals of Cuban-Americans in media (Corzo, Santiago, 1992, p.1B). Two
complaints were filed with the group. The first piece of business on the agenda was the
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Foundation’s complaint against the Herald. Mayor Xavier Suarez was on the
committee, along with approximately 15 members of the Foundation (Appendix B).
Lawrence and his fellow colleagues from both the Herald and El Nuevo met with the
committee to discuss the newspapers’ coverage and later described the meeting as
“robust, to say the least” (Chardy, Corzo, 1992, Feb. 7, p. 3B). Suarez’s memorandum
regarding the committee’s meeting with Lawrence and other Herald executives notes
that “after much effort on [the newspaper executives’] part, I believe we (the executive
committee) left convinced that they do not understand or do not want to admit the
problem” (Appendix B).
Suarez, who took a lead role in the league, regularly corresponded with Herald
executives, including Knight Ridder CEO James Batten. In a February 10 letter, Suarez
recounts a telephone conversation in which he reiterated his resentment of Batten’s
question of whether the committee against defamation was “controlled by Jorge Mas”
(Suarez, 1992, February 10). A number of articles reported Suarez’s assertion that the
Cuban Committee Against Defamation was not driven by CANF’s campaign against the
Herald. The mayor said that the fact that the group formed at the time was “a
chronological coincidence” (Clary, 1992, March 1, p. 4A). Nonetheless, Mas
announced the creation of the league in conjunction with his charges against the Herald
at a press conference in late January. The CANF leader was also listed as a member of
the committee.
Some members of the Hispanic media community were reluctant to support the
efforts of the committee. Emilio Milian, a radio commentator for WWFE “Radio Fe”
said he feared that the committee would interfere with the First Amendment.
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Further, he said that he worried that the group would be “used to the personal
benefit of persons or entities” (Chardy, Corzo, 1992, p. 1B). Milian, known for his prodialogue stance in regard to U.S.-Cuba policy, was the victim of a bomb explosion
during his tenure at WQBA. The bomb went off under the hood of his car, resulting in
the amputation of both of his legs (Soruco, 1996, p. 39, Balmaseda, 1992, March 21, p.
3A). The station directors of WQBA and WAQI did not comment on the creation of the
anti-defamation group (Chardy, Corzo, 1992, p. 1B).
Mas continued to air his attacks on the Herald on local radio stations and the
editorial pages of daily Spanish and English-language newspapers. In tandem with
rallies, meetings, and other grassroots means, the CANF’s campaign unwittingly began
to stir the hostilities of some segments of the Cuban-American. This hostility
manifested in vile attacks on the Herald and its top executives. Its vending machines
were vandalized with graffiti and signs. Feces were reportedly stuffed into the coin slots
(Kurtz, 1992, Feb. 4, p. D1). Makeshift signs were placed on machines and read in
Spanish “ Miami Heral-do official organ of the Communist party” ( Miami Herald,
1992, February 2, p. 13A). The Herald’s top executives Carlos Verdecia, Roberto
Suarez, and Lawrence received death threats and the newspaper received a bomb threat.
( Chardy, 1992, Jan. 31, p. 3B; Hockstader, Booth, 1992, p. A1; Kurtz, 1992, Feb. 4, p.
D1). The FBI and the City of Miami Police Department were called in to investigate
the threats (Clary, 1992, March 1, p. 4A).
Lawrence in the meantime continued to use the “Viewpoints” section of the
Herald to respond to the events of recent days. He called the entire episode “a defining
moment for our community.” The publisher retold the news of the threats on Herald
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employees and the vandalism of newspaper racks in Hialeah, Coconut Grove and
Miami Beach. While Lawrence did not accuse Mas, he did suggest that the exile leader
incited people to commit the acts against the Herald.
We have no one to accuse. Among the most visible and vocal of our
critics are people who would never countenance or encourage violence
themselves. But when you make wild and angry accusations, like some
of this “pro-Castro” garbage, you stir up the less well-intentioned and the
more misguided (Lawrence, 1992, Feb. 2, p.13A).
The intensely heated debate between Lawrence and Mas seemed to reach its
climax when two international organizations intervened to investigate the conflict. One
was the Inter American Press Association, an organization with a mission to protect
freedom of the press throughout the Americas, and the other was the Americas Watch, a
human rights group.
The IAPA, an amalgam of international and national journalists, customarily
investigates threats to press freedom in militarized zones in the Americas. The fivemember team made its first trip in IAPA history to investigate the threats against the
Miami Herald, and to look into the circumstances that may have given them rise. The
team included journalists from such Latin American nations as Brazil and Venezuela.
The organization ironically found itself in the unique position of critiquing the practices
of part of a press system it endeavored to model in other countries.
In its mission statement following the investigation, the IAPA said that it
considered the threats against the Herald to be “serious” and urged “authorities to
investigate them thoroughly and prosecute those responsible (The Miami Herald, 1992,
March 22, p. 2B; Lawrence, 1992, March 27, p. 13A). The association also pointed out
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that the Herald and CANF battle should serve as an important lesson to other
newspapers, which face an ever-changing demographic of readers.
We also consider the tension between the Herald and some Miami
Cuban exile groups as a “warning flag” for all newspapers undergoing
major demographic changes…Maintaining a free press is vital to the
demographic functioning of all communities, especially those
undergoing major changes in composition of community such as Miami.
So we call for vigorous support to the Herald from other members of the
media, particularly in Florida, in connection with the continuing
investigation against the paper (The Miami Herald, 1992, March 22, p.
2B; Lawrence, 1992, March 27, p. 13A).
The study also concluded that, while the Herald was striving to meet the needs
of its diverse readership, the IAPA assessed that the daily was partly responsible for the
events of past weeks. The distance that the Herald initially placed between itself and its
coverage of the Cuban community lingered over time and resurfaced in CANF’s
campaign. The Herald was working toward the deconstruction of what Gonzalo Soruco
coined “Fort Herald” (1996, p.41). The IAPA acknowledged that the Herald’s
treatment of the Cuban-American and, more specifically, the exile community played a
part in the heightened hostilities it was experiencing.
The Miami Herald is clearly trying very hard to meet the challenge of
covering a changing community, and even its critics admit it has made
progress. However, it is also true that the Herald was slow to understand
the new cultures within its readership area (The Miami Herald, 1992,
March 22, p. 2B; Lawrence, 1992, March 27, p. 13A).
Although IAPA President James McClatchy assigned responsibility to the
groups represented by Mas and Lawrence, both the publisher and Foundation leader
used the report to bolster their arguments against each other. The Friday following the
release of the association study, Lawrence ran the statement of the IAPA’s conclusions.
The IAPA logo appeared above the headline “From the publisher.” The statement was
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sandwiched between Lawrence’s declarations that his newspaper had not requested the
independent inquiry and that the Herald “will continue to seek to be fair to all”
(Lawrence, 1992, March 27, p. 13A).
The Foundation issued its statement following the release of the IAPA’s study,
commending the association for its findings and conclusions. In its three-fold response
to the study, which also agreed with its assessment that those who threatened the Herald
should be found and prosecuted, CANF emphasized its finding that the Herald was
partly responsible for the tense climate in the community.
We congratulate the Inter American Press Association for recognizing
publicly that the Miami Herald has been slow in understanding our
culture…But the Miami Herald, and especially El Nuevo Herald, still
have a long way to go to understand and respect our ideals and our
institutions (The Miami Herald, 1992, March 22, p. 2B).
Both Mas and Lawrence viewed the IAPA study as proof that each was correct
in their positions in the conflict, and framed the association’s statement accordingly.
CANF viewed the report as a vindication of what it had been saying to Herald
executives all along – that they simply did not make the effort to understand the CubanAmerican culture. In the last of his lengthy opinion pieces, Mas once more cited the
IAPA’s findings that the Herald was “late in responding to the needs of the CubanAmerican community” (Mas, 1992, March 27).
However, the IAPA was more critical of the exile community in its findings. It
specifically admonished the exile groups for comparing the Herald to a Communist-run
state newspaper.
It is ludicrous to state, as some groups do, that the Miami Herald is a
propaganda organ of the Castro government in Cuba. Such irrational
charges are damaging to the cause of free speech (The Miami Herald,
1992, March 22, p. 2B).
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As with the IAPA study, Americas Watch also condemned exile groups in its
study for creating a political environment of intimidation and censure (Garcia, 1996, p.
151; Rohter, 1992, March 19, p. A16).
By April 5, the dispute between Mas and Lawrence had passed its peak in the
pages of the Herald. The 900-word opinion pieces and editorials had dwindled down to
a few paragraphs each. The pieces expressed a desire by both sides to come to a
resolution. Through the four months, the placement of Lawrence and Mas’s pieces had
become so commonplace that it practically had its own section in the newspaper under
the headline “More on CANF-Herald Dispute” (1992, April 5, p. 3B). In his piece, Mas
wrote,
The responsibility to be fair, and the duty to assure that we learn from
this dispute, belongs to us as well as The Herald. How to lay the
groundwork for a better understanding among all of us belongs to us.
You and I, Mr. Lawrence (1992, April 5, p. 3B).
The first line of Lawrence’s response posed the question, “ Why don’t we just agree to
disagree?” (1992, April 5, p. 3B). By April 19, Lawrence was discussing new matters in
the “Viewpoints” section. Only three paragraphs mentioning the updates on the
publisher’s recent conversations with Mas accompanied the piece on Florida Governor
Lawton Chiles (Miami Herald, 1992, April 19, p. 3C).
Following what seemed like a virulent winter in the tropics of Miami, Lawrence
and Mas reconciled their differences in May, although a compromise was not reached.
The Miami Herald and CANF did not come to an agreement on the coverage of Cuba
and the exile community. Mas announced that he had called off the campaign against
the daily for the time being. The exile leader proclaimed that the Foundation had been

50

successful in achieving its campaign goals. The coverage, he said, had become “more
objective” in the weeks following IAPA study (Viglucci, 1992, May 22, p. 3A).
Lawrence still argued that the Herald had not been insensitive to the issues and needs of
the Cuban-American community.
Mas and Lawrence each declared a truce on the way to an Easter Seals
fundraiser. They were both scheduled to speak at the event. The comments they made
to each other were reminiscent of a celebrity roast script and not as if the two had been
engaged in a bitter battle over the Herald’s agenda. Mas said commended Lawrence for
putting “up a hell of a fight on behalf of his people, no matter how wrong they are”
(Viglucci, 1992, May 22, p. 3A).
The nasty battle prompted by an editorial against Congressman Torricelli’s
Cuban Democracy Act was over. After several rounds of acerbic exchanges in the pages
of the Herald, a few death threats, police and FBI investigations, and an independent
inquiry, the two men had come to the conclusion that they should agree to disagree.
Amidst the resolution, Mayor Xavier Suarez poised himself as the mediator
between both sides. He said that “explaining Mas to Lawrence and Lawrence to Mas”
had been among the most difficult of the mayor’s endeavors (Miami Herald, 1992, May
22, p. 3C). A second draft provided in the Foundation’s materials, dated April 2,
suggests that Mas intended to end the campaign against the newspaper early before the
Herald published the last of his opinion pieces in late April (Appendix C).
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Lessons Learned
The end of the CANF campaign brought publicity to the divisiveness of the
Miami community. Some scholars and observers suggest that the conflict was a result
of cultural misunderstanding. Anthony Maingot, a social scientist at the University of
Miami, believes that the heated exchanges between Lawrence and Mas were
representative of two distinct worlds of culture (1992, p. 9A). Media portrayed the clash
of Miami powerhouses as revealing “ethnic rifts” (Constable, 1992, p. 3). Upon closer
inspection, those analyses of the campaign against the Herald concede that politics is at
the root of the contention, not only between the Foundation and the newspaper, but also
among the increasingly heterogeneous makeup of the Cuban community.
The first wave of Cuban emigres from Castro’s revolution, the “Golden Exiles,”
built a culture out of a political ideology. The catalysts for the Foundation’s most
vehement attacks on the Herald have been political in nature. An important point to
note, particularly as it relates to the Cuban community, is that culture and politics are
intertwined so much that these elements are indistinguishable from each other. Even
though CANF’s campaign was sparked by a negative editorial against Congressman
Torricelli’s bill, Mas was not off the mark in arguing that such a gesture was an attack
on the culture of the Cuban community.
To a certain extent, Mas’s Foundation and Lawrence’s Herald emerged
victorious from the four-month-long contest of wills, if only for the short term. The
publisher held fast to his initial contention that his newspaper had not been insensitive
to the issues and needs of the Cuban-American community. In addition, the IAPA
statement mostly condemned the exile community for its behavior during the campaign,

52

particularly warning them about making such incendiary remarks as comparing the
Herald to Castro’s Granma. This independent study somewhat vindicated the Herald
from the charge of bias in its coverage of the Cuban community, although the IAPA
team also pointed out the newspaper should have responded more quickly to the
demographic change in its readership. In fact, Lawrence was later named president of
the IAPA in 1995. In his incoming speech, the Herald publisher called on Latin
American nations “to educate readers and dispel myths and stereotypes” (Editor &
Publisher, 1995, Oct. 21, p. 14).
The Herald fought a long hard struggle for the right to its editorial opinion on
U.S.-Cuba policy issues in the end. Although such a perspective may not help to foster
relations with CANF or the exile community, nothing can ever really force the
newspaper to concede its viewpoint, except perhaps a decline in circulation. Despite
the billboard, bumper stickers and buses that read “I don’t believe the Miami Herald,”
the newspaper was not hurt financially.
As the entire dispute played out in the pages of the Herald, most people were
ultimately compelled to keep up with every episode of Mas vs. Lawrence. This is
evident in that the Herald lost less than 60 subscribers and experienced an increase in
advertising sales during the months of the campaign (Adweek, 1992, May 4).
As for Mas, the Foundation had proven its point and boosted its membership
along the way. Francisco “Pepe” Hernandez, CANF president, told reporters that
membership increased by 1,200 during the campaign. According to Hernandez, the
increase signaled the full support of the Cuban community (Clary, 1992, March 1, p.
A4) on their side of the dispute. Mas succeeded in bringing attention to the “institutions,
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values, ethics and ideals” (Chardy and Corzo, 1992, p. 3B) of the Cuban-American
community too a degree, although it came as a result of an editorial against a CANFendorsed policy measure. The campaign took center stage in local media and also
gained significant coverage across the nation. This gave Mas the unique opportunity to
frame his message, using the symbols of Cuban culture and patriotism to mobilize his
de facto constituents.
After Mas proclaimed the campaign’s success, CANF had the confidence to
fight other battles. In October, the Foundation filed a libel suit against Americas Watch
for its report, “A Dangerous Dialogue,” charging that the Foundation was using
government funds through the National Endowment for Democracy to support its
programs. CANF lawyer Richard Mayberry also demanded an apology and a retraction
from the human rights group for claiming that his clients contributed to an environment
of censorship and intimidation in Miami (Mayberry, 1992, Oct. 7). The Foundation
also initiated legal action against the Public Broadcasting System for a documentary
entitled “A Campaign for Cuba” for making statements similar to those reported by
Americas Watch (Mayberry, 1992, Oct. 13).
In 1996, the Foundation won another noteworthy victory against the New
Republic for an article that about the life of CANF Chairman Jorge Mas Canosa. The
1994 article was written by Anne Louise Bardach, a contributing editor at Vanity Fair
magazine, and was entitled “Clinton’s Miami Mobster.” Bardach likened Mas to a
mobster twice more in the article: in the headline and in the text of the piece.
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The article, much like the Miami Herald’s editorial against the Cuban
Democracy Act, could not have come at a more critical time in the Mas’s relationship
with Clinton.
The exile leader was in negotiations with the Clinton Administration to
reevaluate the policy toward Cuban rafters. Immediately, CANF lawyers sprung into
action and filed a libel suit against the New Republic and the author of the scandalous
article, and this time Mas clearly won the battle.
Bardach had made a number of mistakes that were uncommon for a journalist of
her caliber. She used anonymous sources from the State Department in gathering the
information that led her to compare the exile leader to a Miami crime boss. In addition,
she did not interview Mas or any of his colleagues at CANF and in the exile
community, save for Raul Masvidal, the former Foundation director who resurfaced as
one of the harshest critics of Mas during the Herald dispute in 1992 (Ackerman, 1996,
June 20).
The New Republic in its own right exhibited sloppy editing of the article. The
magazine’s editors mistakenly described Bardach as a freelance writer when in fact she
was a contributing editor to Vanity Fair. In 1996, The New Republic settled with Mas
and the Foundation for $100,000. CANF used the money to establish scholarships for
Cuban-American journalism students with financial need (Pogrebin, 1996, Sept. 17, p.
A17).
Jorge Mas Canosa died the fall of the following year at the age of 58. Even after
the Foundation lost its inspirational leader who was known to have met every challenge
with his well-known declaration, “Adelante, adelante,” or “forward, forward,” it
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continued to challenge media. The organization no longer found itself at odds with the
Herald’s coverage. After its mostly symbolic triumph against the New Republic, CANF
took on the conservative exile community’s greatest nemesis in American media, the
New York Times. Ann Louise Bardach, along with Times writer Larry Rohter, was
again in a feud with CANF, this time implicating Mas and other directors in terrorist
activities in Havana. The articles were an account of Luis Posada Carriles’s
experiences as a militant anti-Castro activist hiding in the jungles of Guatemala. This
particular series of articles, in fact, was the first time Posada disclosed the full details of
his 37-year involvement with exile leaders, most prominently members of CANF. Ann
Louise Bardach and Larry Rohter reported that Posada said the “hotel bombings and
other operations had been supported by leaders of the Cuban American National
Foundation” (July 12, 1998).
Immediately, CANF leaders contacted Times editors to challenge the allegations
in the articles. A faxed letter from George Fowler, III, CANF executive director and
lawyer representing the Foundation, demanded a full page retraction of the portions of
the July 12 article that implicated “ the Foundation and its leaders in the funding of any
violent acts in Cuba or through Mr. Luis Posada Posada” (Fowler, Personal
Communication, July 15, 1998).
The letter also demanded that the retraction include Posada’s statements to
media, in which he denied ever implicating CANF leaders in his schemes, financially or
otherwise. Following the articles in the Times, Posada told Spanish language television
station WLTV-23 that Bardach contacted him to offer him “ the chance to clarify the
distortions in the media.” Instead, Posada claimed Bardach distorted his story and
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“wrote a terrible report of falsehoods” (Yanez, July 15, 1998). CANF finally challenged
the editors and reporters to produce the tape that specifically said that the organization
had financed or been responsible for the bombings. Rojas explained that when the
Times reporter could not corroborate what she had claimed Posada told her in
interviews, the editors had no other choice but to negotiate a retraction. “When they
finally did run a correction to the article, they didn’t call it a retraction,” explained
Fernando Rojas, spokesperson and political advisor for Mas. After agreeing to a
admitting their oversight, the editors commented that CANF “sure knows how to get its
message across” ( Personal communication, June 16, 1999). Indeed, CANF did not get
the front-page retraction its lawyers requested. It appeared to be more an affirmation of
the original article than it was an admission of error. The Times’ Sunday, August 16
edition printed a three-paragraph editor’s note on page 2A, citing an “editing oversight”
in one sentence of the article. However, the third paragraph does not specifically state
that CANF did not financially support the bombings:
He [Posada] also noted that leaders of the foundation had publicly
expressed support for the bombings, which they characterized as and act
of internal rebellion. But as was made clear elsewhere in the article, Mr.
Posada said Mr. Mas and other leaders of the foundation did not earmark
money for specific operations and asked not to be told how he used their
funds (New York Times, August 16, 1998, p. 2A).
In the long term, the clash between the Herald and the Foundation hindered both
institutions, to the detriment of the entire community. The CANF’s campaign
permanently changed the way the newspaper dealt with stories on or affecting the
Cuban community. Stories on Cuba were given much more editorial consideration and
required more effort from reporters. Doug Clifton, the Herald’s executive editor,
admitted shortly after the Foundation feud that the newspaper was much more careful in
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reviewing stories on Cuba and the exile community than it had been before CANF’s
full-scale campaign. He said that “it was good sense” to be more careful in editing copy
after being the target of “an intense public relations campaign to attack your credibility”
(O’Connor, 1992, p. 42).
Lawrence was already viewed by his newsroom colleagues as a corporate
journalist willing to compromise journalistic values to appease the dominant voices of a
divided community. The lengthy exchange further tarnished his reputation and also
caused resentment among reporters on his staff. Several journalists and scholars argued
that Lawrence ceded too much ground to the dominant exile perspective that CANF
represented. Lawrence’s attempts to build bridges across the Cuban-American cultural
divide was considered by many to be more akin to pandering to the dominant exile
ideology (Swartz, 1999, June 7, p. 36). Further, his style of civic journalism was not
well received by his own staff.
Many at the Herald argued that Lawrence did not give an equal voice to all the
diverse segments that comprise Miami, such as the other Hispanic and Caribbean ethnic
enclaves. Special attention was placed on coverage of Cuba and Cuban Miami. Herald
reporters said that coverage of the Foundation and Cuban-Americans was carefully
scrutinized. After the CANF-Herald dispute, one of the daily’s reporters said “there has
been a watershed in how we operate with Cuban questions” (O’Connor, 1992, p. 42). A
New Republic article in mid-May called El Nuevo Herald “a mouthpiece for the exile
leadership” (Lizza, 2000, May 15, p. 18).
Other observers suggested that Lawrence’s idealistic attempts at changing the
newspaper’s relationship with a multi-ethnic community ended up catering to the
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loudest voice in the city—the voice of the Cuban exiles as represented by the
Foundation. His effort toward fostering a more cohesive community in which the
Herald could thrive was therefore regarded as a failure (Swartz, 1999, June 7, p. 36).
The Herald also nearly suffered a loss in its ability to gather news on Cuba, as a
direct result of the several months of exchanges between Lawrence and Mas. The very
fact that both figures engaged in a dialogue on the rights of a free press and its duty to
the citizens of Miami was enough convince Fidel Castro that the Herald was yielding to
the demands of the Foundation. The Cuban government initially denied visas for Herald
reporters. Castro cited Lawrence’s editorials, specifically repeating the publisher’s
statement that the Herald had not shifted its longtime editorial position against el lider
(Clifton, 1992, May 3, p. 3C).
Miami’s metro daily, through no fault of its own, was in the precarious position
of reporting news both on the island and in the Cuban community, while endeavoring to
neither offend Castro nor the Foundation. The CANF’s campaign put pressure on the
Herald staff to pay particular attention to Cuba-related news, and when it did, its
reporters were prohibited from covering Cuba from the inside. Ironically, because the
composition of its readership requires the Herald to report news on Cuba with greater
depth and breadth than most any other daily in the U.S., Castro will less likely approve
visas for its Miami staff. Instead, the regime preferred that the Herald send a writer
from the Washington bureau, who “was not tainted by Miami” (Clifton, 1992, May 3, p.
3C).
The CANF-Herald battle especially exposed the deep political rifts of that
existed between the Libertarian system of media and an ethnic community diametrically
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opposed to liberal ideology. CANF’s campaign against the Herald served as an
example of the worst-case scenario in writing about the exile community.
Members of media, such as Jim Mullin, editor for the New Times weekly paper,
were harshly critical of Lawrence’s long-winded diatribes with Mas. Also, the
Foundation’s charge that the Herald was biased against the Cuban-American
community was not resolved in the end. The newspaper never offered the exile
community any compelling reason to end their decades-long distrust of media. The
Foundation continued to be absolutely vigilant over the coverage of their organization
and Cuban Miami, as well as any policy measures it endorsed.
These circumstances constitute a double-edged sword in reporting news in the
enclave, particularly for Cuban-American journalists. For example, Juan O. Tamayo, a
seasoned journalist who has covered the Middle East and the Gulf War, is a CubanAmerican who has deliberately kept away from covering Cuba. He explains the no-win
situation of covering the news on the island, especially when any aspect of the story
might deal with exile leadership. “That was my last line of defense – that I will not
cover the exile community,” Tamayo said. After several years of working outside of
Miami’s beltway, the career foreign journalist found himself in the quandary he tried to
avoid.
In 1998, Tamayo broke the story on Luis Posada Carriles, the alleged perpetrator
of hotel bombings in Havana, who initially linked CANF in the terrorist plot. Tamayo
said that the CANF took to AM radio, as it customarily did, and called him everything
from a spy for the Cuban government to accusing him of having a mistress in El
Salvador.
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Yet, Tamayo admits that the relationship between the Cuban community and the
Herald, and the Anglo media in general, has been very bad. He also points out that
“Dave [Lawrence] can be a real asshole” (Tamayo, 1999, Aug. 5).
The worst part of covering Cuba-related stories, however, is that because he is
Cuban-American, fellow journalists automatically assume that the story will be reported
with a conservative “exile” slant:
The assumption is that I have something intrinsically, or whatever you
want to call it, that makes me have a bias on Cuba. That really pisses me
off. I think that’s the worst part of that job, and in a way I think it
denotes a certain kind of racism. So no matter how liberal I think I am,
whether I agree with the members of the journalism community or the
exile community, there are members of the journalism community who
see you as a stereotype (Tamayo, 1999, Aug. 5, personal interview).
The non-Cuban community in Miami may have lost the most at the close of the
dispute. For four months, Miami’s only English-language daily exchanged viewpoints
on an issue that involved only one segment of its readership, albeit the largest growing
segment of the city’s population. During that bitter winter between the Herald and
CANF, the “marketplace of ideas” in the pages of the daily only had one thing to offer
to all its readers. Spring arrived and nothing had been resolved between Lawrence and
Mas, and their debate had overshadowed the discussion of any other pressing issue in
the community.
In a letter to the editor, one Miami resident wrote, “You show a staggering lack
of judgment in giving Mr. Mas and people of this caliber so much space” (Miami
Herald, 1992, February 10). The newspaper’s duty of providing the reader with the
comprehensive review of the day’s events had been diminished for the sake of a debate
between two of Miami’s most powerful men. In addition, only two perspectives on the
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Cuba policy issue received ample space in the pages of the Herald for discussion.
Consequently, even at moments when the virulent exchange of ad hominem attacks
revealed traces of substantive debate, the Miami community was denied the ability to
form a thoughtful, well-rounded opinion through the self-righting process.
The difficulty of covering Cuba-related stories, as evidenced through Tamayo’s
anecdote and the CANF campaign, may have a chilling effect on the next generation of
Cuban-Americans with a desire to participate in the politics of the Miami their parents
have created. Interviews with young, politically active Cubans indicate that both
coverage and the way in which the Foundation deals with media should change (Cruz,
1999, August 13; Pollack, 1999, August 13; Miranda, 1999, July 26, personal
interviews).
Henry Pollack, 31, and Alex Cruz, 23, both aides to Congresswoman Ileana
Ros-Lehtinen, agree that the CANF leadership alienates younger Cubans, especially
those who were not born in Miami and arrived in later waves of immigration. “I don’t
think that the Foundation has anything to do with me; they only represent a small
segment of wealthy older businessmen” (Pollack, 1999, August 13, personal interview).
Mario Miranda, Jr., 26, son of Jorge Mas Canosa’s former bodyguard and organizer of
Jovenes de la Fundacion, had seen a sharp decline in attendance from the initial
meeting of the Foundation Youth. “It’s just that we are all so busy, that it just got harder
to get together” (Miranda, 1999, July 26).
The interview responses of these younger Cuban-Americans denote a sense of
detachment from their parent’s version of a cause for a free Cuba. They are more
concerned with Cuba now, and what the island nation will be when Castro falls. This
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change in perspective is a generational factor on which the Herald should keep a keen
eye if it wants to foster the next generation of newspaper readers.
One lesson learned from the CANF campaign against the Herald is that the
recommendations of the Commission on Freedom of the Press in 1947 are applicable
today. The Commission strongly recommended a self-regulating entity to prevent
government intervention in the functions of the free press. The IAPA study functioned
as the self-regulating entity that the Commission suggests (1947, p.74). Robert Hutchins
and his fellow commission members used the example of the American Newspaper
Publishers Association, but given the diverse make-up of cities like Miami, the IAPA
serves a more appropriate purpose.
Also, with the advent of the Information Age and the sharp increase in
population of Hispanics in the U.S., the IAPA is better equipped to evaluate questions
of newsworthiness and accurate coverage. The significance of stories to readers in
multi-ethnic communities is no longer bound by county, state, or national borders. The
dynamic between the Herald and the exile community illustrates that point. Thus, the
Herald is well served by the self-regulatory function the Inter American Press
Association served in its disagreements with CANF and Mas.
The Herald’s role in the heated debate with the Foundation proved the timeless
value of yet another of the recommendations made by the Hutchins Commission. As a
result of four months of debate and the subsequent shift in newsroom policy regarding
stories on Cuba, other members of the local and national journalism community
engaged in vigorous mutual criticism (Hutchins, 1947, p. 94).
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Jim Mullins, editor of the New Times, an alternative bi-weekly paper, had a field
day criticizing Mas for his attempts to strongarm the Herald and Lawrence for acting
fooling in letting the exile leader get away with his tactics. Mike Clary, former staff
writer for the Herald all but predicted that the editorial policy would be changed to suit
the needs of the exile community. Upon Lawrence’s arrival at the Miami newsroom,
Clary wrote that staff knew the former Detroit Free Press editor was put at the Herald
to keep an eye on the bottom line and cater to the whims of Miami’s segmented
community.
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Conclusion
The conflict between Mas and Lawrence in 1992 was a defining moment in
Miami history that also serves as an example for other diverse metro areas. It was a
political struggle of two social and political paradigms veiled by cultures. The
competing values represented by words and symbols served to mobilize an ethnic
community and caused a Metropolitan daily paper to reevaluate its tone and substance
in regard to a single issue.
One set of values had been shaped by the traumatic experience of exile. The
other had been fueled by its insistence it had achieved the lofty goals of balance and
“objectivity.” The battle between the Foundation and the Herald was a vivid glimpse of
what daily newspapers in ethnically diverse metropolitan areas can expect as they deal
with perspectives that are intrinsically at odds with journalism values.
In particular, the social tensions between media and Cuban Miami comprise an
ongoing experiment of that have never been thoroughly analyzed in scholarly context.
At a convention for the National Association of Hispanic Journalists, David Lawrence
made the following remarks:
What is happening in Miami today is a preview of what will be
happening in many American communities in the coming years. If
newspapers are to thrive – even survive – they must keep up with their
changing communities. To achieve excellence a newspaper must cover
all the communities within the greater community…Newspapers can
succeed only if they reflect the full diversity of the communities we
serve (Stein, 1992, May 2, p. 23).
Lawrence’s advice underscores the immense significance historically analyzing
the CANF’s campaign against the Miami Herald and, to a greater extent, the tense
relations between an ethnic community and its local metro daily.
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Just a few years after Lawrence made his remarks at the NAHJ convention, two
other metropolitan areas experienced a similar situation as the Herald- CANF battle. In
1998, the members of the local Puerto Rican community gathered outside the doors of
the Boston Globe. They were protesting a columnist’s characterization of their island as
a “Caribbean Dogpatch” (Sullivan, 1998, Dec. 8, p. 20). The editorial board quickly
addressed the issue with representatives of the ethnic community.
The Los Angeles Times was also besieged with several hundred local citizens,
protesting the daily’s portrayal of Latinos. They objected to the LA Times’ negative
coverage of Latino youths in its crime stories. The demonstrators stood outside the
Times Mirror Square building, calling for a boycott of the newspaper until the publisher
listened and responded to their complaints (Los Angeles Times, 1998, Dec. 21, p. 8B).
These kinds of confrontations will to occur more often as the rising Hispanic population
continues to retain its ethnic consciousness, selecting certain aspects of assimilation but
keeping their ability to mobilize in solidarity around issues that affect their politics of
ethnic identity.
CANF’s campaign against the Herald was greater in magnitude and had a
deeper impact on the media practices and coverage in Cuban Miami than those of the
LA Times and the Boston Globe. The exilio is a unique metropolitan area that has been
completely transformed by immigrant politics and culture. There is no adequate
framework that can explain or even elucidate the uniqueness of experiences in the
Miami community. Ironically, this uniqueness transcends the borders of Dade County
and is evident in many large multiethnic cities, such as Los Angeles and New York.
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Social scientists continue to argue that Miami is a microcosm of the ethnic
dynamics that are occurring throughout the world, especially as it relates to media:
The forces that transformed Miami are very much at play
elsewhere…Miami may not show to other cities the exact image of their
own futures, but the social transformations that have taken place in South
Florida contain important lessons for the momentous changes now
occurring in American urban life (Portes, 1992, p. xv).
The argument made by several observers and scholars cited in the previous
chapter that Lawrence pandered to the political views and interests of the exile
community presents a serious problem for the Miami Herald in the long term. As
generational differences and factors of assimilation start to take effect, the readership
needs of Cuban-Miami change, and the local daily paper must change along with it.
In acknowledging that the conservative exile ideology is dominant and static, the
Herald may not be poised to quickly change with its dynamic, multi-ethnic community.
The various waves of immigration, from the “Golden Exiles” to the Marielitos, and
more recently the Cuban rafters that arrived throughout the early 1990s has made
Cuban-American attitudes toward media difficult to gauge. Yet, as the Hispanic
population in the U.S. continues to grow into the largest minority group by the year
2010, media must learn to meet the needs of this increasingly important part of its
audience and readership.
Unfortunately, research on media uses and attitudes of Cuban-Americans and
other Hispanic groups is virtually unchartered territory. This may be one of the reasons
why metropolitan daily newspapers, in this case the Herald, have been so slow to
understand their diverse readerships, as the Inter American Press Association’s study
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concluded in 1992. Only recently have Hispanics become the subject of study due to
their growing buying power (Subervi-Velez, 1986).
The first step in understanding the processes of a multi-ethnic community that
constantly changes with every successive generation and wave of immigration is to
historically document events such as the dispute between the Herald and CANF. Only
then can editors or social investigators derive meaning from these events and apply
them to other metro dailies facing a rapidly changing demographic of readers. This
work had to rely on first-hand accounts, organization materials, and articles from the
very same newspaper that the exile community charged with bias and cultural
insensitivity.
This thesis provides only a historical fragment of analysis for understanding the
context of CANF’s attitudes toward the Miami Herald. Although historical analyses of
the politics and immigration are plentiful, literature on the history of Cubans’
relationship with media is woefully sparse. The body of research on Cuban-Americans
lacks a more comprehensive historical analysis on usage of and attitudes toward media
in the Cuban community.
An ethnographic profile of different areas of Cuban Miami would greatly
complement any historical background to be used to evaluate messages and the
mediums for those messages. Since ethnic communities and the political dynamic of
each is in a constant state of flux, periodic ethnographic reports would provide the
richest detail possible for understanding media behaviors and attitudes. This type of
study would be of special use to media such as the Herald. Like other metro dailies, the
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Herald conducts readership research frequently. However, telephone and e-mail
surveys often do not explain the “why” behind the “what” supplied by the answer.
While this work provides a context for investigating the dispute between the two
ideologically opposed institutions represented by Mas and Lawrence, a historical
analysis of the CANF’s campaign still leaves many questions unanswered. Central to
this conflict is the issue of whether the Herald was biased in its coverage of the exile
community and showed a lack of balance in its editorials on U.S.-Cuba policy. A
content analysis of the Herald’s stories and editorials would provide answers to this
question.
Because the image of Cubans has differed according to each wave of
immigration, a content analysis should begin with coverage of the first wave of emigres
following Fidel Castro’s revolution, the era of the “Golden Exiles.” Ideally, the content
analysis should be conducted on all three of the major immigration waves. Each era of
coverage should be compared with the other to denote any change in the portrayal of
Cuban immigrants from 1960 to 1990. A content analysis of this sort will serve a
historical purpose in addition to illustrating media’s perceptions of Cuban-Americans.
Another question that this historical analysis has not answered is whether the
Foundation’s distrust of media is representative of all of Cuban Miami. A random
telephone survey conducted by bilingual encoders would help to uncover if in fact the
CANF’s attitudes and actions toward the Herald are on par with the interests of the
constituents it claims to represent. Second-hand evidence showing that the Herald did
not experience a substantial drop in readership suggests that not every Cuban-American
in Miami was influenced to “not believe the Miami Herald.”
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Survey research would also be useful in exploring media attitudes and usage
among different ages and levels of socioeconomic status of Cubans, while taking into
account the factor of immigration experience. This type research should incorporate the
use of whole population samples rather than probability samples, as Soruco suggests
(1996, p. 31). Whole populations take into account factors of assimilation and
generational difference.
Probability samples would likely select respondents from areas such as Little
Havana, in the heart of the Cuban enclave that is home to older, less assimilated
Cubans. The exile ideology, as it corresponds with the first wave of immigrants fleeing
Communist Cuba, pervades these areas. As the Cuban-American community moves
into the third and fourth generations, it is less likely to reside in the enclave. Surveys on
whole populations are therefore important in gathering an accurate representation of the
Cuban community.
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